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
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


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I PROMISE: MAGSAYSAY'S UNIQUE PSYOP "DEPLATS" WORKS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Date: _____

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

When the Massive Retaliation response to Communist aggression was proclaimed by the United States, the Communists were forced to adopt a new form of conquest by which they could subvert and impose their ideology upon weak and emerging or developing nations. The method adopted was the so-called Wars of National Liberation or insurgent wars. This type of war employs guerrilla forces from within the confines of a selected country but ostensibly no outside forces to provoke a United States response. The guerrillas, normally farmers or peasants by day and fighters by night, are provided with logistical support, organizational guidance and strategic direction by outside powers. In many instances, "volunteers" from outside sources are employed in the struggle.

Guerrillas generally find rural areas more desirable as a base of operations because of the abundance of food, absence of government officials and in many instances a disenchanted people.

Insurgent wars during the past twenty-five years have occurred in Algeria, Cuba, Greece, Malaya, the Philippines and Venezuela. Each of these conflicts capitalized on some aspect of citizen discontentment or disaffection in order to perpetuate the movement.

Discontentment among the people of a given country may take many forms and involve deep seated areas of concern; however, they generally fall into the six broad categories as follows:

1. National Independence
2. Relief from active or alleged oppression

3. Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation
4. Economic or social improvement
5. Elimination of corruption
6. Religious expression

One of the classic examples of how a government can defeat an insurgency which threatens to destroy the legally constituted government was that conducted by the Republic of the Philippines. This internal defense effort was successful only after Ramon Magsaysay accepted the position of Secretary of National Defense on September 1, 1950. He served until February 28, 1953, but was elected President of the Republic in November 1953 whereupon he continued to prosecute the war against the Hukbalahap guerrillas.

The Huk guerrillas emerged from a force which fought the Japanese during World War II but because of Communist influence, the Hukks, after the war, proceeded to attempt a takeover of the government.

Ramon Magsaysay was a Filipino of Malayan heritage who was an experienced guerrilla fighter, mechanic, transportation company manager, Military Governor and Congressman prior to his appointment as Secretary of Defense. Of more importance was the fact that he was efficient, compassionate and unimpeachably honest.

Upon assuming his duties as the new Defense Chief, an in depth study of the insurgency situation was made. It revealed that:

1. The guerrilla movement was effective where the people considered themselves among the disaffected.
2. Land ownership was a sore point with the peasant farmers.
3. Soldiers and Constabulary troopers were considered as despicable as the guerrillas.

4. Many supported the guerrillas for self protection.
5. Many military commanders failed to prosecute the war against the Huks.
6. People are less prone to rebellion when they enjoy a rising level of expectations.

7. Most of the insurgents were peasants and workers.

Psychological Operations became a major weapons system to be employed against the Huks after the above findings were evaluated. This weapon was most effective and is credited to a large extent with the success of the entire operation. The question is therefore raised; did Ramon Magsaysay (the man) and his unique PSYOP result in the defeat of the Hukbalahap Insurgency? To find answers to this question, an in depth study was made of the nature of insurgency, of Ramon Magsaysay, the conditions which caused the insurgency and the government response to that insurgency with emphasis on the employment of psychological operations. The study included an examination of all available primary and secondary sources, and an interview with the senior officer from the Republic of the Philippines, in attendance at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Class of 1969-1970. This officer was on active duty during the anti-Huk campaign and provided valuable assistance to the research.

PSYOP involves communications between a sender and a receiver. In this instance, the sender was the government and the receivers were the insurgents, their mass support base, these citizens who supported the government, members of the armed forces and government officials whose actions or inactions contributed to some extent to the cause of the insurgents. All available media was employed to convey messages to the

target audiences including radio, newspapers, leaflets, notices on bulletin boards, word of mouth communications and drama. Unique among the media used was Secretary Magaysay himself, for he commanded a respect from the people which can almost be likened to worship. It was not because he exalted himself above the people but because he was of, by and for the people. He believed in the dignity of man, the worth of the individual and that the grievances of the people should be addressed by an honest uncorrupt and understanding government. His unquestioned honesty reinforced this position. When his PSYOP program employed the term I demands, when dealing with citizens and problems, it was considered an accomplished fact, because Magaysay said so.

The overall internal defense program included strategic and tactical measures. Strategic measures included reform and reorganization in the military in order to improve their image, reform within the government, resettlement programs for insurgents who surrendered, rewards for information, extensive intelligence activities and a host of other unique programs which supported President Quirino's guidance to restore confidence in the government. On the tactical front, PSYOP elements and staff officers were attached to the newly reorganized Battalion Combat Teams and PSYOP was employed in conjunction with the ground tactical plan. Government forces meanwhile assumed the initiative to route the insurgents from their strong-points.

In Manila and other urban areas, attacks, both physical and psychological, were directed against the Communist leadership, the Pultburo in order to destroy the governing body which directed the insurgent activities in the field. The Pultburo included twenty-six members and all were captured except one who was shot during an escape.

attempt when the government conducted a coordinated, simultaneous raid on their places of residence. Intelligence agents conducted the raid based on information supplied to Magsaysay by a reformed Huk who had been given orders to kill the Defense Secretary but was "converted" prior to completing the mission.

With the Pulitburo out of the way and the war in the field going well, the last major project involving armed conflict involved the surrender of Luis Taruc (El Supremo), the leader of the Huk military arm. He finally gave himself up after being surrounded in Barrio Santa Maria near Mount Arayat and the Candaba Swamp in Central Luzon. A news reporter by the name of Benigno Aquino served as an intermediary between Taruc and Magsaysay, then President of the Republic, and assisted in returning the Huk leader to government control.

Magsaysay was extremely interested in social reform in the country but as Secretary of National Defense, found himself limited to the authority vested in that office or by the support given him by the President. When he reached a point where he felt he could no longer prosecute the war due to a lack of Presidential support for social reform, which he considered vital to his PSYOP program, Magsaysay resigned his position. He then ran for President, won the election and continued to move forward with his program of social and other reforms.

Ramon Magsaysay, former mechanic, soldier, guerrilla leader, Military Governor, Congressman, Secretary of National Defense and President of his beloved Philippines was successful in "defeating" the Hukbalahap insurgency when two Presidents before him had failed. The evidence of this study supports the hypothesis that this truly great leader and a unique Psychological Operations plan, based by and large on promise, resulted in the "defeat" of the Hukbalahap.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to express his appreciation to Colonel Lewis W. Powers for his constructive criticisms and assistance during the pre-research phase of this project; Lieutenant Colonel James M. Neill for his consistent advice, counsel and assistance in connection with this research effort and during this entire academic year; and Colonel Rocco M. Paono, Professor and Director of Foreign Affairs at the U. S. Naval Academy for his evaluation and guidance on research format and content. All assistance was most beneficial in completing this research project.

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Bullets remain excellent weapons as are the words of truth and food packages in the struggle against an active, lying rabble-rousing enemy.

... Jose M. Crisol




Figure 1. The Internal Defense Cycle.

...
PREFACE

The internal defense operation conducted by the Republic of the Philippines following World War II was one which demanded a fresh, unconventional and indeed unique school of thought in order to successfully meet the challenge presented by the insurgents.

Weapons and other military materiel will normally be effective if properly employed; however, when augmented and supported by a war against the minds of men, a most effective campaign can be conducted.

In presenting this research paper, the emphasis is not exclusively on what was done to prosecute the war, but rather how the information, the event and the credibility of the source influenced attitudes. Credibility as reflected in Ramon Magsaysay, the "Chief Architect" of the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) campaign against the insurgents, it is suggested by this writer, was the key to the success of the entire campaign. The importance of this point is underscored by the necessity to allocate an entire chapter to Ramon Magsaysay.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the most classic counterinsurgency (lately known as internal defense) efforts of record in recent years is the one conducted in the Republic of the Philippines following World War II. This war, like those in Algeria, Malaya, Cuba, China, Greece and some other countries involved a peasant guerrilla force with the specific aim of overthrowing the legally constituted government, by force, violence or other means. This force, having emerged from a portion of the guerrilla forces which fought the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II was so powerful that by 1950, it almost succeeded in crushing the government.

The relative success of the Hukbalahap or Huk (as the insurgents were called) was not achieved in a vacuum. It rather grew and went through a metamorphosis from 1946 to 1950, the year of its greatest effectiveness, in spite of efforts by the Philippine Government, under two Presidents.

In late 1950, the situation in the Philippines was characterized by chaos, insecurity, not only in the barrios but also in Manila, particularly during the hours of darkness. Officials were being bribed, government troops were being ambushed and villagers subjected to terror and other acts of violence. This increased the citizens' fear of the Hukks and lessened their confidence in the government's ability to restore order and defeat the insurgents.

Recognizing that drastic action must be taken if the nation was to survive, President Elpidio Quirino on September 1, 1950, appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense with an immediate mission of directing the government anti-Huk effort. Success was achieved in the seven years which followed with Magsaysay directing the effort until 1953 when he resigned but continued under his reign as President until his death in 1957.

The key to the success of this remarkable man in dealing with the insurgency is the problem which is presented in this research effort. It is pointed out that in Psychological Operations since the communicator and the message or action are both important; both areas are addressed in connection with this project.

Statement of the Problem

A wealth of reliable evidence establishes that during the years following Philippine Independence (1946-50), efforts were made by the government to address the insurgency problem which the country faced but these efforts were at best ineffective. Reliable evidence also establishes that following the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay to the position of Secretary of National Defense, there was a marked improvement and general turn of events in the struggle against the insurgents. The problem or question which logically follows is:

Did Secretary, later President Ramon Magsaysay with his effective use of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) play a significant role in the defeat of the Hukbalahap insurgency, primarily during the period 1950 to 1957? In posing this problem, it is visualized that Magsaysay the

person and PSYOP, a supporting weapons system in concert influenced the outcome of the internal defense efforts of the country.

In answering this question, we logically raise companion questions. Notable among these is why did Magsaysay succeed when others before him failed? Also, if others had employed Mr. Magcaycay's methods, would they have been successful? One might even raise the question of whether Ramon Magsaysay, a member of the President's Cabinet, responsible for the success or was it in fact President Elpidio Quirino since success came during his administration?

In the pages which follow, the answers to these questions will be provided, based on the evidence revealed during the course of this research effort.

It is pointed out that the entire internal defense effort in the Philippines was a complex, involved action which included military, economic, psychological, social and other contributions. This research addresses primarily the psychological operations aspect as a companion weapons system to complement the overall military operation. The other areas are addressed only as they relate to "winning the hearts and minds of the people" although each area is important in its own right and worthy of full treatment in a major research project.

The Importance of the Research

World War II, which can rightfully be called total war, was the largest conventional war the world has ever known. It was a war in which the enemy, when compared with friendly forces was distinctly recognizable by language, uniform, equipment and in most cases cultural differences. There was a "main line of resistance" (MLR) which separated

friendly from enemy territory in most cases. In a few instances there was contested territory between the two forces. This was a war in which gains or indications of success were based upon the amount of ground or real estate one side captured or how much ordnance was delivered to a target area or perhaps how much vertical construction was destroyed.

The Korean war was to a large extent a repeat of World War II, with the same main line of resistance, "two up and one back" (two elements of a command on line and one in a reserve position) when it could be afforded, and no real problem of contested territory, particularly during the last two years of the war. Among the differences was the fact that the friendly native forces looked identical to the enemy forces who were also native; and there was an extensive organized effort to influence the minds of men.

With the exception of the Korean conflict, most wars which occurred following World War II fall into the broad category of guerrilla wars. This was true in the cases of China, Greece, Algeria, Cuba, Malaya and the most recent conflict in the Republic of Vietnam. The Philippine campaign against the Hukbalahap is a classic example of how a dedicated people, under effective leadership can deal decisively with insurgencies in a positive manner to eliminate a threat from within.

It is vital that the modern soldier-leader understand that insurgency or "Wars of National Liberation" may be expected to emerge on a recurring basis in this nuclear age for many years to come. In researching this internal defense problem, the object was to examine and identify causes or ingredients which generate guerrilla wars or insurgency and some of the effective means of directing preventive and counteraction to the problem.

The education of all military officers would be incomplete if it were based solely on conventional non-nuclear or nuclear principals. They must also be given an opportunity to gain an appreciation for insurgency as a military strategy or tactic and also recognize the place of psychological operations, the battle for the minds of men as another weapons system in the vast arsenal of war. When unconventional methods are being used by the enemy, friendly commanders must defeat that enemy with the same weapons and tactics rather than the conventional two up and one back theory which was successful when employed in those situations for which it was created. The use of those "unconventional" methods can be seen to involve both tactics and strategy, but more importantly, people. As so adequately stated by Haggerty, "The main strength of guerrilla war is found in its very lack of military formality. Peasants or workers by day, guerrilla fighters by night."¹

It is important then, that among the many storehouses of knowledge, that psychological operations know-how be filed and readily available for immediate and effective employment by governments and field commanders when its use can materially influence internal defense or other military efforts. Further, when thinking of flexible responses, they must not limit their courses of action to frontal assaults penetrations, air mobile or vertical envelopments or amphibious assaults when an effective psychological operations campaign might be the one vehicle which will accomplish the mission either unilaterally or in conjunction with other military action before, during or after the campaign.

¹Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1964), p. 6.

The limits then to the responses of most field commanders to a plan of operation will lie in his imagination and full utilization of his intellect. The use of psychological operations will depend on this parameter.

Research Methodology

Researching this problem involved the examination of an event which occurred in the past. It further involved the interrelationships between men and movements, a quality which is identified in all insurgencies. Since the application of the scientific method of inquiry into a historical problem is involved, this project is rightfully identified as historical research.²

Involved in the process of this problem solving process was the specific identification of the problem from many associated with the broad subject of the Philippine Insurgency, formulation of an hypothesis and the collection of appropriate data. The latter process by and large involved a survey of available literature on hand in the Command and General Staff College Library and Archives, and other military and civilian libraries in various locales in the country. These references included both primary and secondary sources. One of the works consulted and cited was by Jose M. Crisol who served as the director of the psychological operations effort for Secretary Magsaysay and later served as Deputy Secretary of National Defense.

To further objectify this research effort, interviews were conducted with the senior student officer from the Republic of the Philippines

²John W. Best, Research in Education (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 86.

in the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Class of 1969-70. This officer, Colonel Jesus Dizon, was on active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) during the Hukbalahap insurgency and had firsthand knowledge of the efforts of Secretary and President Ramon Magsaysay. Other efforts to secure additional data were of limited value.

Definition of Terms Used.

In the interest of clarity and uniform application, the following definitions apply to the terms indicated when used throughout this thesis:

Communications. The interchange of information among people.³

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.⁴

Guerrilla. One who participates in irregular or guerrilla warfare, particularly as a member of an independent or semi-independent unit, usually engaged in sabotage.

Guerrilla Warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.⁵

Huk. A contraction of Hukbalahap, used informally. This term is used extensively in this thesis and refers to the word Hukbalahap as defined below and to the NPA (People's Liberation Army) the successor name

Stanisl Lerner and Wilbur Schram, Communication and Change in the Developing Countries (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966).

⁴The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (JCS Pub. 1) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 59.

⁵Ibid., p. 98.

which the Bukalahan adopted during the latter phases of their existence.

Bukalahan. A word used to identify a guerrilla force which existed in the Philippines in the 1940's and 1950's. It is coined from the initial syllables of the Tagalog title of the organization Malibong Bayan Laban sa Japon or "Peoples Army to Fight the Japs."⁶

Insurgency. A low intensity conflict in which the active combatants make up only a small portion of the population of a country.⁷

Internal Defense. The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.⁸

Key Communicator. One who has qualitative or quantitative persuasive power to effect behavioral changes among individuals or groups of which he is a member. The basis of this power may be religious, social, economic, political or perhaps a combination thereof.

Persuasion. That body of effects in individuals (receivers) which are relevant and instrumental to goals desired by the source, brought about by a process in which communications (of all types) were the initiating vehicle.⁹

Psychological Operations. Those actions including psychological

⁶The United States Armed Forces, Pacific, General Headquarters, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1943.

⁷Andrew Melnar, et. al., Human Factors Considerations of Underground Insurgencies (Washington: American University Press, 1965), p. 74.

⁸The Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit., p. 114.

⁹W. C. Fotheringham, Perspective on Persuasion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), p. 8.

warfare, of a political, economic, military and ideological nature which are planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups, the emotions, attitudes or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.¹⁰ This term is further simply defined as the planned use of communications through words, symbols and actions to influence the behavior of people.

Psychological Warfare. A mental struggle or conflict designed to influence the thinking and behavior of people; an organized effort which involves the use of applied psychology coordinated with economic and diplomatic operations before the war and with military and political operations during the war.¹¹

Propaganda. The intentional or unintentional influencing of people in political or ideological life by means of behavior or written or spoken words.¹²

Pulitburo. The central leadership body which directed the efforts of the Hukbalahap insurgents. This group of civilians were located in Manila. Most occupied respectable positions in the community.

¹⁰The Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit., p. 170.

¹¹Eulogio Dua, "Why Psychological Warfare," Armed Power is Peace Power, II (February, 1952), 2.

¹²Bela Scunyogh, Psychological Warfare (New York: The William Frederick Press, 1955), p. 112.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY

The objective of this research effort is to address the issue of the employment of psychological operations in the Mukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines; however, before this issue can be properly treated, insurgency per se must be discussed.

For many military and civilian personnel who see wars in terms of World Wars I and II and the Korean war; visualizing "new" applications of warfare such as those employed in insurgency is not an easy or simple matter. It is sometimes next to impossible to change an attitude even when conclusive documentary evidence is provided. This situation can be compared somewhat with the attitudes and resistance which prevailed to some degree between the disciples of the known distance (KD) range firing method, when Trainfire I was introduced in 1956. In this case, conventional warfare in which territory seized was the yardstick for measuring success yields, and people influenced or controlled becomes the objective of the war effort.

With the advent of the "massive retaliation" policy of the 1950's, the Communist sought to employ other means for imposing their movement on other nations, particularly the weak, sometimes shaky governments often found in the developing nations. A vehicle which would achieve the desired Communist objective of world domination was needed but this means, whatever it was, must be one which did not involve an overt armed attack from without, by their forces and thus would not trigger the massive

retaliation involving strategic nuclear weapons which the United States had declared unequivocally would be her response. The war from within was determined to be the answer. It has been used by the Communists and others in a great number of documented instances during the past quarter of a century. This particular type of war became known as "Wars of National Liberation," in which the war is ostensibly waged from within by local nationals, under the guise of Civil War. External influence is provided in the form of logistical support, leadership, strategic direction and in many cases armed troops who "volunteer" for such duty. Both Russia and Mainland China (and recently the North Vietnamese or the Viet Minh as the case may be) supported such conflict while maintaining an official position of non-involvement. When friendly nations assist the country under attack, the friendly powers are charged in the court of world opinion, as well as in official diplomatic and international circles as the aggressor who intervenes in an internal or civil conflict. The friendly power also lacks the support of some of her own citizens who tend to make judgements on the basis of what appears to be the obvious without having facts on which to make objectified value judgements.

Insurgency is characterized by the employment of what is sometimes known as unconventional methods and irregular forces who in most cases are indigenous to the area in which the insurgent operation occurs. The forces are most often called guerrillas who during the day are able to live a normal life, blend in with the local population and thus conceal his true purpose. The insurgent operations in such cases are mainly conducted at night or at times when the absence of the men from the community would not be subject to question by the masses.

Although there are a number of documented examples of urban insurrections, those conducted primarily in cities; rural areas are felt by most noted authorities consulted to be the area best suited for insurgency. The rural area provides a natural setting for the type warfare which is involved in insurrections. This was best stated by McCuen as follows:

The revolutionaries almost invariably find it easier to establish themselves in the "countryside" - isolated, difficult terrain where the governing authorities are weakest, know least what is going on, and show the least interest. Here the revolutionary manages to form a network, recruit followers and organize them into guerrilla bands while concurrently taking over the isolated villages. Faced with the one-two punch of intimidation and persuasion, the local people usually find it expedient to cooperate and remain silent.¹

The primary objective of insurgency (and counter-insurgency, as it were) is the allegiance of the people.² If the people are convinced, through propaganda or their own biases, that the insurgent cause or the specific issues involved reflect their needs, aspirations or "rising expectations," they will lend their moral support and physical assistance. This support includes individual persuasion of others to support the revolution but also includes providing food, clothing, medical support, use of fields and out buildings of farmers for secreting supplies, or perhaps serving as couriers between guerrillas and the ruling body or putlitburo as it may be called. Of course, a prior to this support is belief in the issue or cause. The issues vary but may include land reform, colonialism, imperialism, corruption in government or some other

¹John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter Revolutionary War (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 33.

²S. N. Bjelajac, Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counter-insurgency (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, 1966), p. 14.

problems toward which the people are sensitive. The issue may be real or imagined but the important thing is not what is but what the people believe to be factual. It must touch an area of dissatisfaction in the hearts and minds of the people. Dissatisfaction may involve a variety of factors, or deep-seated emotional problem areas; however, they will generally fall into the following broad areas:

- 1) National Independence
- 2) Relief from active or alleged oppression.
- 3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.
- 4) Economic or social improvement
- 5) Elimination of corruption
- 6) Religious expression³

Following the establishment of specific issues on which to base an insurgency, the protagonist will generally initiate a psychological campaign toward a select target group. Words then become an important weapon in the conduct of an insurgent war effort. Communism recognized and appreciated the value of psychological warfare to the extent that they "put words on par with guns and regard ideas with as much favor as bullets."⁴

Psychological campaigns are conducted using all available communications media (radio, printed matter, word of mouth communications, television spots and where appropriate, drama). Themes are developed from which specific messages are prepared and directed toward the selected target audience. All elements, from sympathizers to hard core members are potential target groups in this psychological campaign.

Concurrent with the psychological campaign is the matter of financial support which is necessary in any social, political or military

³United States Army, Field Manual 31-15, Operations Against Insurgent Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 5.

⁴William J. Miller, et al., The Meaning of Communism (Morristown, N.J.: Silver Burdett Company, 1963), p. 9.

movement. Fund raising and psychological operations are mutually supporting. At the conclusion of a rally, for example, financial support is solicited; a procedure not unlike some political rallies in this country. This action takes advantage of the emotional state which has been generated by oratory or pictorial presentations. Funds may also be generated by the collection of taxes from the citizens of a target area. Many contribute because they genuinely support the revolutionary movement and feel that their financial support will further the cause. This support may be due to a desire for a better life or because of hard core Communist party affiliation. Others support the insurgency because they believe in "getting on the bandwagon" of the winning team when they foresee such. Some pay taxes or perhaps its better called protection because of fear. They feel that physical harm will come to them, their families or perhaps their home, barn or crop will mysteriously catch fire. Many refuse to pay the taxes or otherwise support the insurgents because they don't believe in the movement and feel that they should continue their support of the government in power. In such situations and when it is felt to be in the best interest of the insurgents, they resort to terror as a means of influencing behavior. This terror might take many forms - a broken finger, a cigarette burned face, or in extreme cases death by torture. Selective terror is employed to influence the victim or his family but it also is calculated to influence a larger audience. This vehicle is used with discretion and in most cases when the psychological battle is either lost or needs a catalyst. In the words of Mao Tse-tung:

... to put it bluntly, it was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area; otherwise one could never suppress the activities of the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry.⁵

⁵Mao Tse-tung, Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan (Vol. I, Selected Works; New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 27.

problems toward which the people are sensitive. The issue may be real or imagined but the important thing is not what is but what the people believe to be factual. It must touch an area of dissatisfaction in the hearts and minds of the people. Dissatisfaction may involve a variety of factors, or deep-seated emotional problem areas; however, they will generally fall into the following broad areas:

- 1) National Independence
- 2) Relief from active or alleged oppression.
- 3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.
- 4) Economic or social improvement
- 5) Elimination of corruption
- 6) Religious expression³

Following the establishment of specific issues on which to base an insurgency, the protagonist will generally initiate a psychological campaign toward a select target group. Words then become an important weapon in the conduct of an insurgent war effort. Communism recognized and appreciated the value of psychological warfare to the extent that they "put words on par with guns and regard ideas with as much favor as bullets."⁴

Psychological campaigns are conducted using all available communications media (radio, printed matter, word of mouth communications, television spots and where appropriate, drama). Themes are developed from which specific messages are prepared and directed toward the selected target audience. All elements, from sympathizers to hard core members are potential target groups in this psychological campaign.

Concurrent with the psychological campaign is the matter of financial support which is necessary in any social, political or military

³United States Army, Field Manual 31-15, Operations Against Insurgent Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 5.

⁴William J. Miller, et al., The Meaning of Communism (Morristown, N.J.: Oliver Durdall Company, 1963), p. 9.

movement. Fund raising and psychological operations are mutually supporting. At the conclusion of a rally, for example, financial support is solicited; a procedure not unlike some political rallies in this country. This action takes advantage of the emotional state which has been generated by oratory or pictorial presentations. Funds may also be generated by the collection of taxes from the citizens of a target area. Many contribute because they genuinely support the revolutionary movement and feel that their financial support will further the cause. This support may be due to a desire for a better life or because of hard core Communist party affiliation. Others support the insurgency because they believe in "getting on the bandwagon" of the winning team when they foresee such. Some pay taxes or perhaps its better called protection because of fear. They feel that physical harm will come to them, their families or perhaps their home, barn or crop will mysteriously catch fire. Many refuse to pay the taxes or otherwise support the insurgents because they don't believe in the movement and feel that they should continue their support of the government in power. In such situations and when it is felt to be in the best interest of the insurgents, they resort to terror as a means of influencing behavior. This terror might take many forms - a broken finger, a cigarette burned face, or in extreme cases death by torture. Selective terror is employed to influence the victim or his family but it also is calculated to influence a larger audience. This vehicle is used with discretion and in most cases when the psychological battle is either lost or needs a catalyst. In the words of Mao Tse-tung:

... to put it bluntly, it was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area; otherwise one could never suppress the activities of the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry.⁵

⁵Mao Tse-tung, Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan (Vol. I, Selected Works; New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 27.

The psychological battle is not conducted against individual human targets alone. It is also directed against institutions. The regularly constituted government is one of the prime institutional targets for the psychological (as well as military) campaign. This battle is waged by not only the organized guerrillas but by those in government who support the insurgent cause and by organized members of the party apparatus. The campaign is directed toward influencing the actions of the government response to the insurgency in a manner which is favorable to the insurgency effort. It is in essence then, an action "to deceive the governing authorities into making too little effort too late with tactics inappropriate to the particular stage of the war."⁶

Many of the actions are self-defeating and therefore are a calculated risk but considered worthy of the chance by the insurgents in many cases.

One of the major aspects of an insurgency is its overall organization. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the Communists have conducted most of the insurgencies; therefore, an examination of their organization is appropriate.

Most of the discussion in this chapter has centered around the military element of the organization. Actually in a typical organization, this arm is organized generally along military lines with vertical control from the top to the lowest units. The chief element of the overall organization is the National Party. It is the element which controls the entire operation. Its activities might be open or underground but its powers are absolute. Internally it includes cells, party chapters, a

⁶McCuen, loc. cit.

central committee, politburo and secretariat. Where appropriate, youth organizations also operate under party supervision.

Mass organizations form a large segment of the overall Communist organization for insurgency. It is here that the Liberation Front is located. This front organization is sometimes looked upon as the political arm of the movement. It would normally form the basis of the new government when the insurgency succeeds in bringing about the collapse of the existing government. It is therefore sometimes called a shadow government.

It is interesting to note that although there is vertical operational control within each of the three major arms of the organization, ideological control is lateral (Figure 2).⁷

The organization briefly described above, although not a detailed treatment, establishes that insurgency is not directed by a haphazard organization nor is it a loose operation in which events happen with no prior planning. Its operations are based on a well planned, deliberately executed methodology. Although differences incident to local application do exist, general principles are employed in all subversive insurgencies.

With respect to philosophy, Cho Guevara saw the following general principles as doctrine, relative to military operations:

- 1) A guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable requirement.
- 2) Fighting should take place on favorable (to the insurgent) ground.
- 3) Supply is a very important consideration.

⁷United States Army Command and General Staff College, Reference Book 31-100, Vol. I, Insurgent War Challenge and Response (Ft. Leavenworth: Field Printing Plant, 1969), pp. 1-1 to 1-13.




Figure 2. Typical Communist Organization for Insurgency.
(Extracted from RB 31-100, Vol I, USACGSC.)

4) The right of the people to be paid (for support and services) will be respected but pay will be in the form of bonds -- Bonds of Hope.⁸

Other principles and guidelines have been advanced by many authorities (including Guevara) in the field of guerrilla warfare. Perhaps the most radical or unusual among them is the fact that the Communists, and perhaps others who employ guerrilla warfare, suggest that all of their "soldiers" need not be armed. In fact, some suggest that only about one third of the fighting force needs to be armed but insist that in any engagement, no weapons are to be left on the battlefield. This is in part due to the austere logistic base upon which the movement is usually built. It is also due to the fact that in any army, the United States Army included, not all troops are actively engaged in fighting (firing of individual or crew served weapons) even in the most heated of battles. Guevara, in addition to the above principles, stated in another writing that it is most important that the guerrilla have an extensive knowledge of the terrain; that he be able to move rapidly and have the support of the people. Secure hiding places were considered an absolute necessity. He stressed hit and run tactics in which the "enemy" is stalked, attacked on ground favorable to the attackers and then the process is repeated. Guevara was also a realist and recognized that the guerrilla should not over extend his base of operations. When guerrillas become battle casualties, they are never left behind without recovering ~~their~~ his equipment. He also realized that "guerrilla war is a preliminary step, unable to win a war (conflict) all by itself."⁹

⁸Che Guevara, Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 17.

⁹Marries-Clichy Patterson, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962), p. 7-30.

The above statement that guerrilla warfare is preliminary in nature suggests that there is a stage beyond this level. Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that the yardstick for measuring success was people controlled or influenced rather than land seized. This further suggests another possible level of insurgency.

Although there are some differences in the various levels of insurgency, Szonyough identifies four distinct phases of revolutionary warfare. They are:

- 1) Organization
- 2) Terrorism
- 3) Guerrilla Warfare
- 4) Mobile Warfare¹⁰

Nazard, with minor differences, suggests that there are not four but five levels of insurgency which include:

- 1) Clandestine Organizations
- 2) Psychological Offensive
- 3) Organized Guerrilla Warfare
- 4) War of Movement
- 5) External Aggression¹¹

The preceding pages have briefly described in general terms, insurgency and its approach to bringing about the fall of an existing government and state. A thorough knowledge of insurgent methodology is therefore vital to the maintenance of a free and prosperous nation in which the citizens of that nation can pursue their fortunes in the absence of internal chaos.

¹⁰McCuen, op. cit., pp. 30-40.

¹¹J. Nazard, "Guerre Revolutionnaire et Pacification" Revue Militaire L'Information (January, 1957), p. 16.

Although the organization for insurgency and many of the insurgency procedures and philosophies are based upon Communist thought, it is an area in which other non-Communists have had some exposure. In fact, "it was practiced by American frontier fighters -- notably "Swamp Fox" Francis Marion against the British Red Coats long before Karl Marx was born."¹²

¹²Miller, et al., op. cit., p. 173.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY

In examining the Philippine Insurgency, one might raise the question -- who is the enemy and where did he come from. The answer to this question on the surface might appear to be one with a readily available, simple answer but such is not the case. The answer in fact is hidden in 400 years of history and involves economic, social, political, military and many other considerations. In addition, the strategic position of the Philippines forms a logical corridor from the countries on the mainland of Asia, southward to the Southern Continent of Australia and Antarctica. It is also on the east-west shipping lanes from the Americas to the Middle East and Europe.

The climate, natural resources and the resultant demand for a large labor force, and attraction of foreign investment and interests provide further insight into Philippine insurgency problems.

In an effort to answer the question of the origin of the insurgents, the following three areas are examined in depth:

History and Geography of the Republic

The history of the Philippines actually was born in Europe (for practical purposes) on August 10, 1519 when Fernando Magellan, a Portuguese navigator under Spanish Flag, sailed his vessel out of Seville, Spain, on an around the world cruise. Unable to secure financing in Portugal, Magellan had turned to Spain and was successful. He landed on the Island of Cebu, South Central Philippines on April 7, 1521. Since

the journey in search of new trade routes to India was sponsored by Spain, it was ipso facto that the country should be name The Philippines, after King Philip II of Spain.¹

Geographically the Philippines lie between the South China and Philippine Seas in the Pacific. She is 1152 miles long (north to south), 682 miles wide on the large northern island of Luzon. There are 7,100 islands in the chain. Of this number, 2,773 have yet to be named. The largest of these include Luzon, Mindanao, Panay, Mindoro, Negros and Samar (Figure 3). There are 56 provinces, 45 chartered cities with many municipalities and barrios--second and third level political subdivisions, respectively.²

The Filipino people fall into three basic categories; the Negrito, Indonesian and the Malayan. A total of eight languages and eighty-seven dialects are spoken in the Philippines.³

The Philippines were under Spanish rule virtually from 1521 to 1898. These 377 years of Spanish Colonial rule brought with it Spanish methods and values. Notable among these were the practices of large land holdings by a small powerful and wealthy minority. Many of the Spanish citizens had received Royal Grants of huge tracts of land, to include the natives who inhabited the land. Large haciendas (plantations) soon emerged. The church was not to be left out of the "land grab," for she

¹T. L. Rhoads, The Philippines (Boyertown, Pa.: The Author, 1930), p. 6.

²United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Geographic Note, Philippine Administrative Division (GE-27) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966).

³David Bornstein, The Philippine Story (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947), pp. 3, 12.



Figure 3. The Philippines.

(From Robert R. Smith, *US Army in World War II, War in the Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 20.)

too secured large holdings; thus, there were both lay and religious haciendas.

Native Filipinos worked the plantations as either tenant farmers or hired hands making as little as \$25.00 per year which advanced to approximately \$85.00 per year just prior to World War II. The tenant in addition to little remuneration, lost his sweat, toil and in most case his self-respect. This system remained virtually unchanged even though there were many peasant revolts, until the end of Spanish rule.⁴

The destruction of the Spanish Fleet off Cavite in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, signaled the end of Spanish rule. Spain subsequently ceded to the United States, the Philippines as well as Guam and Puerto Rico. From that time until 1946, the United States ruled the Philippines but not without problems. Although there were many improvements in the political and social machinery, many of the age old Spanish Colonial policies, particularly those relative to land ownership prevailed. This problem and others precipitated a guerrilla war against the United States from 1899 to 1902 but it was not until 1905 that complete "pacification" was achieved.

In the years that followed, a distinct movement toward independence began to develop in the Philippines. In 1924 a delegation was sent to Washington to discuss an independence proposition to the United States Government. The Chairman of the Philippines Commission, as it was called, was Manual Roxas who later served as the first President of the Philippine Republic. Relations between the two countries were somewhat strained in

⁴Robert R. Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency - Economic, Political and Military Factors, "CONFIL OF TWENTY NINETEEN MILE, DEPARTMENT OF WAR"

that little rapport existed between the Governor General, who represented the President of the United States, and the Filipino leaders. In a hearing before the United States Senate on March 5, 1924, Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas presented a copy of a letter which President Calvin Coolidge wrote to Mr. Roxas concerning independence. It suggested conclusively that the United States Government did not feel that the current relationship between the two countries should continue. The letter further stated in part:

If the time comes when it is apparent that Independence would be better for the people of the Philippines from the point of view of both their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and if when that time comes the Filipino people desire complete independence, it is not possible to doubt that the American Government and people will gladly accord it.⁵

Realizing the aspirations of the Filipino people, after further extensive efforts the Congress of the United States passed and the President signed on March 24, 1934, Public Law 127 (The Tydings-McDuffie Act) granting Independence to the Philippines, effective July 4, 1946. This bill was ratified by the Philippine Legislature on May 1, 1934. Pending the realization of this event, the law provided for the United States to control foreign relations, defense and major financial decisions. In all other matters, the Philippine President and a unicameral legislature would administer the country.⁶

Discontentment, banditry, graft and other domestic problems existed in the years of the American rule until World War II and the

⁵ United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions. Philippine Independence Hearings, 68th Congress, 1st Session, on S. J. 92, March 5, 1924 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), p. 3744.

⁶ _____, House of Representatives, Philippines Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Act, 73d Congress, 2d Session on H.R. 5573, March 19, 1934 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 4900.

Japanese occupation. This occupation presented special problems of survival, freedom and self-respect to the Filipino people but to some extent, it provided a vehicle for internal unity. Also born of this unity was the Hukbalahap Insurgents who became the object of the Philippine internal defense effort following World War II.

It is not the purpose of this research to address the question of exploitation by the country dominating the Philippines, whether Spain, the United States or Japan; however, it is appropriate to note that the country has more potential wealth than most other countries in the Pacific. The soil is fertile and the climate tropical. She supplies thirty-five percent of the world's copra and coconuts. Her cacao is the raw material for the by-products of cocoa and chocolate which she produces in abundance. There are 15,000 square miles of land under cultivation, with a principal crop of 100 varieties of rice and an annual crop of 636,832 metric tons of sugar. There are in addition 40,000 acres of forests under cultivation.⁷ Each dominating country had access to this wealth, in one form or another from 1521 to 1946.

At the conclusion of World War II, the United States kept its promise of full freedom and granted Independence on July 4, 1946. Following this event, in the midst of the post-war reconstruction, the Huk movement grew to a point where by 1950, it was a formidable force, challenging the legally constituted government of the country.

The Origin and Development of the Hukbalahap

The defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific during World War II and the subsequent withdrawal of the United States forces did not automatically

⁷Rhoads, op. cit., pp. 21-35.

insure the free exercise of democracy in the Philippines.

In 1945 the Philippine Commonwealth became the free Philippine Republic but free democratic institutions did not automatically flourish after the withdrawal of American controls. . . . The Republic lacked in sufficient numbers, well trained, competent and honest native democratic leaders to meet the overwhelming problem of political, social and economic dislocation.⁸

The situation described above was an example of the conditions which provided a medium for the birth and development of the Hukbalahap in the Philippines.

Although it was thought by many to be an organization which was a direct outgrowth of World War II elements, the movement actually was formed in the early 1930's by one Pedro Santos whose original cause was agrarian reform. Land in most cases was concentrated in the hands of a small minority of wealthy and in many cases, absentee landowners under a system which dated back to the period shortly after Magellan landed in 1521. During the Japanese occupation, the Hukbalahap formed a guerrilla force and took up the cause to rid the Japanese from the country but they refused to work with or under supervision of other guerrillas who were directed and coordinated by General Mac Arthur's Armed Forces, Pacific Headquarters. This created a problem of unity of action in the Pacific war effort as reflected in a GHQ staff report as follows:

The Hukbalahap, a semi-political, semi-bandit organization centered in Bulacan and Pampanga is one of the largest and most powerful guerrilla organizations in Central Luzon. It owes no allegiance to the United States, the Philippine Commonwealth or Japan and has not only constituted a problem to the Japanese but to loyal guerrilla organizations and intelligence nets. It will probably remain a difficult problem during the reoccupation and

⁸William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 369.

possibly afterwards. Hukbalahap is a word coined from the initial syllables of the Tagalog title of the organization Hukbong Bayan sa Japan or "Peoples Army to fight the Japs."⁹

The Communist influence on the Huk movement dates back to about 1925 when an Indonesian Communist by the name of Tan Malaka visited the Philippines to seek delegates for a conference to be held in Canton, run by the Communist dominated International Organization of Trade Unions. Chrisanto Evangelista attended this conference but also a number of other such meetings in Berlin and Moscow. He became a Communist and affiliated his Philippine Labor Congress with the Red International. The next year the PLC split and Evangelista, heading the radical wing, developed his group into a legally constituted political party. The Philippine Supreme Court declared the Communist Party illegal in 1932; however, as in other countries, the Communists operated from an underground posture.¹⁰

The Hukbalahap guerrilla force was conceived in December, 1941, following the Japanese attack. It was formally organized on March 29, 1942.

The political arm included some of the members of the Communist underground, intellectuals, politicians and army personnel. Participating in the organization was Luis Taruc, a native born Filipino, born of peasant stock but idealistic in orientation. He was named commander of the guerrilla movement and directed its efforts until 1954 when he surrendered to government forces. Although the Huks fought the Japanese during the war and are credited with destroying approximately 25,000

⁹The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, Vol. I (General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific, 1943).

¹⁰Richard H. Sanger, Insurgent Era (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., Publishers, 1967), p. 129.

Japanese during 12,000 engagements between the beginning of the war and the liberation of Manila on February 3, 1945; this force refused to have their efforts coordinated by Armed Forces Far East Headquarters. They also refused efforts by Lieutenant Colonel Claud Thorp at a meeting with Luis Taruc on May 21, 1942, when extensive efforts were made to arrange for unity against a common enemy. Colonel Gyles Merrill later reported in 1944 that thirty percent of the Huk guerrilla force were properly indoctrinated USAFE personnel.¹¹

At the end of the war, many of the Hukbalahap guerrillas became disenchanted with the government when they were not recognized as being legitimate by the American forces and they did not receive back pay, benefits and legitimacy. They then expanded their bandit operations in Central Luzon in the vicinity of Mount Arayat and the Candaba Swamp (Figure 4). From this base of operation, raids were launched against villages, police stations, ammunition and supply dumps and other facilities in order to secure military hardware. The party organization and pulitburo was established in Manila, a propaganda magazine TITUS or "Spark" was published and distributed. Insurgents also concentrated on building and consolidating their gains.¹²

The Huk leaders included both men and women. Prominent among them were Andre de los Reyes (Commander Bulakiak) who commanded troops in the Quezon Province of Luzon; Jesus Lava; Mateo de Castillo; Costa

¹¹Franklin Mark Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 178-180.

¹²Edward G. Lansdale, "Counter Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines," Anthology of Related Topics on Counterinsurgency, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 153.




Figure 4. Huk Controlled Areas, 1946.

(Adapted from A. H. Peterson et al (ed), *Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counter Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine Huk Campaign*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963, p. 11.)

Alejandro and Luis Taruc. Leadership problems did exist; however, they were corrected when the Chinese Communists sent Field General Eng Kiet who improved discipline and provided military leadership to the group. The Philippine Communist Party had always been oriented toward Communist China rather than Moscow.¹³

Having developed to a strength of approximately 15,000 troops and a 300,000 mass support base or sympathizers, the Huks initiated their first armed encounter with government troops in May, 1946. In the years that followed, a number of armed encounters and terrorist incidents occurred while Presidents Manual Roxas and Elpidio Quirino tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a political settlement. The citizens, having been relatively apathetic were finally awoken and outraged when in April, 1949:

... they (the Huks) committed one of its infamous crimes when they ambushed and killed Mrs. Aurora Quezon, the wife of the late President Manuel L. Quezon; her oldest daughter, Baby (Mirle Aurora); her son-in-law Philip Buon Comino III; Quezon City Mayor P. Borgado and eight other persons.¹⁴

The above event demonstrate the strength and boldness of the Huks and their ability to openly challenge the government. During this same period in 1949, the news media reflected the successes being made by Mao Tse-tung in his efforts to overthrow the Nationalist Chinese Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek on Mainland China. This victory and the guidance provided during the visit of Chinese Field General Eng Kiet, coupled with the indicated successes of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China

¹³Sanger, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁴Uldarico S. Baclogon, Lessons from the Huks Campaign (Manila: M. Colcol and Company, 1960), p. 5.

was positive evidence that Communism was on the road to complete victory. The Hukbalahap then changed its name to conform to the "new horizon." The new name adopted was Hukbong Matatagpilaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the Peoples Liberation Army. As used in this paper, the term HMB and Huk thus become synonymous.¹⁵

With the change of name, the HMB continued to expand both its armed troops and its mass support base to a point where the country was almost in a state of chaos and in dire need of drastic action and direction.

The Critical Conditions of 1950

Philippine Independence in 1946 destroyed one of the guerrillas' major themes--that of land reform. During the reorganization and build up period following the war, land for the landless, American imperialism and terrorism against the people became the main occupation of the Huk.

By 1950 organization was virtually complete in both the Communist Party (Figure 5) and the military arm, the HMB (Figure 6). The military organization included regional commands which were formed as necessary when more territory was brought under Huk control. The insurgents had expanded their territory from the four provinces which they controlled in 1946 to virtually all of central and southern Luzon with expansion probes being made in the north and southward toward Mindanao (Figure 7). The strength of the HMB numbered at least 20,000 armed guerrillas. This force assisted by the mass support base roamed about the countryside at will. They were particularly strong in the rice and coconut areas of

¹⁵Sanka, op. cit., pp. 181-193.






Figure 5. Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
(From Robert R. Smith, *The Hukbalahap Insurgency—Economic, Political and Military Factors*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963. p. 87a.)



*Figure 6. Organization of the Hukbalahap National Military Department.
(Adapted from Robert R. Smith, *The Hukbalahap Insurgency—Economic, Political and Military Factors*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963. p. 88a.)*



*Figure 7. Huk Controlled Areas, 1950.
(Adapted from A. H. Peterson et al (ed), *Symposium on the role of Airpower in Counter Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963. p. 12.)*

Central Luzon. The logistical support for the most part was provided by the Partido United Defense Corps (PUDC) which was formed in 1946 but was reorganized as the National Peasant Union (NPU). This agency not only provided supplies but also assisted in operating the Communist Party ideology machinery.¹⁶

Among those commanding HMB forces was former United States Army private Ronald Dorsey of Three Rivers, Massachusetts, who at twenty years of age came to the Philippines as a member of the 29th Engineer Battalion (Topography). He and one Benjamin Advincula, a Spanish-Filipino employee, joined the HMB. He was raised to the rank of Colonel and commanded HMB Company Number 4. He had all of twenty-five body guards and four hundred troops under his command. His downfall was signaled when he conducted a raid on a village and thereby lost the popular support of the people. He and Advincula surrendered to government intelligence agents and provided valuable intelligence to the government.¹⁷ This raid was typical of the daily raids and other acts of terrorism being conducted against the people. They became more frequent and spread into neighboring Negros, Panay and Manila, already in the center of the HMB area, was unsafe for a pedestrian at night and in some cases by day. Not only were attacks directed against the people and their villages but many were directed against Army and Constabulary outposts, convoys and patrols. These actions were primarily conducted to secure arms, ammunitions and communications equipment. Government officials were often targets for the insurgents unless they were "protected." When the farmers' crops were burned

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷"The Philippines," Time, LV (June 10, 1950), p. 36.

or otherwise destroyed, and when villages became untenable due to insurgent actions, the people were moved and resettled by the government but no action was taken by the Quirino Administration to make the sweeping reforms which were needed. The only answer which was advanced was more action by the armed forces. President Quirino even visited a few military bases during the spring of 1950 to exhort his troops to better performance but the results were unchanged. Again, the problem was a failure to recognize the need for the removal of corruption and social problems, and thus influence the minds of the people if the crux of the insurgency problem was to be addressed.¹⁸

In one incident, which underscores the critical 1950 period, raids were conducted on four towns concurrently in the provinces surrounding Manila. The results included murder, pillage and burning and a total of forty-four constabulary troopers and civilian dead in four days of fighting.¹⁹ In the area surrounding Clark Air Force Base (50 miles north of Manila), the situation was no better than in other surrounding provinces. A total of twelve airmen and civilian employees were killed by the middle of 1950. Communication lines were no longer secure and curfew had been established by the base commander on a daily basis from one hour before sunset until one hour after sunrise.²⁰

Washington (the United States Government) began to express serious concern about the problem of insurgency. This concern, along with the mounting crisis in the Philippines, forced President Quirino to take positive steps to address the insurgency problem. This action led to

¹⁸Smith, op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁹"The Philippines," Time LV (April 10, 1950), p. 44.

²⁰_____Time LV (May 29, 1950), p. 28.

the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense, which signaled an abrupt turn of events in the war against the insurgents.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL MILITARY POSTURE, 1950

The previous chapter addressed the posture of the insurgents and their relative combat power. As the new Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay in evaluating the government's relative position had to consider his military forces, their organization, training, equipment and their ability to engage the enemy on the field of battle.

The organization which existed was constructed along conventional lines, to fight conventional wars but under a condition which was anything but a conventional conflict. No war had been declared and little in the way of positive results had been generated during the few encounters which government forces had with the Huks in an offensive operation.

As will be pointed out in the next chapter, the former Secretary of National Defense resigned when he found himself unable to secure the support of President Quirino on reform measures. In addition, the appointment of Magsaysay as Defense Chief resulted in the dismissal of a number of high ranking officials in the Defense Department. It can be seen therefore that part of the problem was an apparent lack of imagination by senior military personnel and their civilian supervisors; and a failure on the part of the President to institute needed reforms. One reform measure which was approved was one which was designed to facilitate better cooperation between elements of the armed forces in their fight against the Huks. This action placed all of the military forces under the Department of Defense and established the major components of this department.

The Constabulary

One of the oldest institutions in the Philippines is the Constabulary. It was organized in September, 1901, three years after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. It was a proud force, having fought to rid the islands of bandits from 1901 to 1906. It is also interesting to note that this force was also the first to earn the Medal of Honor when Second Class Inspector Henry Kanauber and Privates Manuel Gonzales and Luis Perez were presented with the coveted award by the authority of General Orders Number 8, February 27, 1902, as a result of an encounter with eight rebels headed by one Captain Julian Ramos.¹

The Constabulary was under the Department of the Interior in 1950, thus presenting problems relative to coordination and unity of effort on anti-guerrilla operations. The reorganization of April 1950 prior to the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay placed the Constabulary under the Defense Department to correct this problem and thus provide for a "single manager" for the government's anti-guerrilla effort. In addition, this change signaled an end to the graft and corruption which had existed in the organization for the past few years. The force had developed a bad reputation and was looked upon with disdain by many citizens who felt that it became a puppet to the Japanese during the war. It developed a reputation for looting and otherwise mistreating the people for whom it was created to serve.

Secretary Magsaysay, who recommended the transfer of the Constabulary to the Defense Department when he was Chairman of the House Committee on National Defense, completed the reorganization tasks upon being appointed as the Defense Chief. This included defining the role of the Constabulary

¹Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1933), p. 35.

and establishing its force level at 7,000 men. He then directed that the surplus manpower be absorbed into the Army. The duty or mission of the Constabulary was to serve as a quasi-military force in civilian national police type duties.²

The Armed Forces

The Army in 1950 included 13,000 men which resulted from a peak strength of 37,000 on Independence Day, July 4, 1946. These forces, after the reorganization in April 1950 included a cavalry force, K-9 (dog) Corps, rangers and the necessary organizations to coordinate Navy and Air Force patrols with ground troops.³ There were also ten Battalion Combat Teams (BCT) available for field duty and direct action against the guerrillas.

Secretary Magsaysay wanted to expand his military force to 30,000 men (including the Constabulary) and he felt that he could count on approximately one million of the seventeen million citizens to support without reservation, his policies.⁴ The Battalion Combat Teams were increased as planned from ten to twenty-one with a total of 22,500 men. These forces were employed as a mobile strike force, with the scout ranger teams as a strategic reserve.

In addition to the two major forces described above, a civilian commando force was created with regular army officers and cadre filling key positions and armed men and women filling the ranks of the force. Their specific duty was to defend and hold those areas which had been liberated from the insurgents and thus free the battalion combat teams

²Smith, The Malabatac Insurgency, p. 100.

³Oscarska, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 207.

⁴Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 33.

for further field duty.

In essence then, by the end of 1950, four months after Ramon Magsaysay assumed his duties as Secretary of National Defense, he had built upon the reorganization plan which he previously recommended in an effort to streamline the military forces of the country. He made additional organizational changes but all were designed to improve the relative combat power of the forces.

Although many of the sources consulted differed on the exact strength figures of the government forces (and the insurgents as well) most agree that with the 7,000 force level for the Constabulary, the total Armed Forces of the Philippines totaled approximately 30,000 men by the end of 1950.

CHAPTER V

THE ILLUSTRIOUS RAMON MAGSAYSAY

In his address at Gettysburg in November 1863, Abraham Lincoln spoke of the proposition that "all men are created equal." A literal acceptance of this statement is of course applicable only to equality before man-made institutions, for it is a fact that men are not created equal. In terms of innate ability, size, mental stability and capacity, personality, attitudes and a host of other physical and character traits, men differ widely.

Plato, writing in his Ideal State, 400 years B.C. apparently appreciated the theoretical problem regarding differences in people. Aristotle differed somewhat but advocated various periods and levels for the training of the competent. In the New Testament, the parable of the talents is an indication that Jesus clearly recognized the existence of differences among people.

From these early beginnings, the world has seen the emergence in the vast pool of humanity, of a select few personalities who appear to have been preordained to greatness in the truest sense of the word. These individuals, few though they have been, appear to have a certain presence, a charisma or some would say, the will of Divine Providence to accomplish a specific mission, or fill a specific need for the people of his time and indeed of times to come. Many have completed their tasks; others achieved only the initial phases of the tasks, leaving others or perhaps time to finish the job which they began.

Looking back over the pages of history, scholars and laymen alike have placed such persons as Moses, The Apostle John, Mahatma Gandhi, Winston Churchill, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., to list only a few, in the category reserved for the truly great. This writer suggests that the world can do no less than to include the late Ramon Magsaysay (Figure 8) in this small group of select persons; a place which he earned and so richly deserves.

In a sense, Ramon Magsaysay can be looked upon as a modern day Father of his Country for he, like George Washington, directed the military effort of his country against an armed enemy and later, as president provided further leadership in a period of crisis to a people in dire need of direction.

Ramon Magsaysay was born on August 31, 1907, in the village of Iba in Zambales Province on the west coast of Luzon in the Philippines. He was the son of a school teacher, blacksmith and farmer. His life from this point can be placed into the three broad categories of the early years, the guerrilla commander and the public servant. These areas will be treated separately since they are so vastly different as to be distinct in themselves yet each period illustrates the uniqueness of Ramon Magsaysay.

The Early Years

Life as a child in a small rural town in the Philippines just after the turn of the century was not unlike life in similar settings in America. Iba, in Zambales Province where Ramon Magsaysay was born and spent his early years, was founded in 1572 (just 51 years after Magellan discovered the Philippines) by a Spanish adventurer by the name of Juan Salcedo.¹

¹ Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, The Magsaysay Story (New York: John Day Company, 1956), p. 13.




Figure 8. Ramon Magsaysay. (From *Life*, XXXIV (April 20, 1953), 111)

Farming and related occupations provided the primary source of activity and income for the people of the community. This was also true with young Ramon. His father was a school teacher but he also farmed and operated a blacksmith shop.

The elder Magsaysay awoke his son Ramon at 6:00 each morning whereupon he accomplished his chores and went to school. When not in school, he learned the fundamentals of hard work by plowing and doing other farm duties, or by "slinging" a sledge in the smithy. Not only did Ramon learn hard work but he was also taught honesty by his parents. In fact, so honest was the elder Magsaysay that he was dismissed from his school teaching position because he flunked the son of the superintendent of schools.² The family was thus forced to move to Castillejos, a village some thirty kilometers away to seek employment. Ramon was ten years old at the time.

There was no high school in Castillejos so young Ramon had to walk twenty-two kilometers per day to attend school at Zambales Academy in San Narciso where he later graduated as Saluditorian of his class with an outstanding record.

At age twenty Magsaysay entered the University of the Philippines and began a liberal arts education but later changed his field of study to mechanical engineering in which he felt more adept but he later dropped out of college. Having the forethought, Magsaysay later worked his way through Jose Rizal College with a part-time job with a transportation company. He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Commerce in 1932.³

²Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia (New York: John Day Company, 1955), p. 119.

³Ibid.

Magsaysay was always fascinated by automobiles and motors. He naturally looked for work in this field after graduation and accepted a job as a mechanic with a bus company where he advanced to the position of manager.⁴ He also managed to marry pretty Luz Barzon of Bataan Province, the daughter of a well-to-do family, also in the transportation (passenger bus) business.⁵

World War II brought about many changes in the lives of the Filipino people. It was no different with the Magsaysays. When the Philippines were attacked by the Japanese, he did what he felt he must. He turned 150 busses over to the Army and went with them by enlisting in the 31st Infantry Division.⁶

Service in the Armed Forces

Magsaysay served in the Philippine Army until Bataan fell to the Japanese. He then fled to the hills where he helped to organize and fought with a guerrilla army in his home province of Zambales in Western Luzon. He was commissioned a Captain on April 5, 1942, and served with the "fugitive army" in the G-1 office and also as a supply officer. He later became the Commanding Officer of Zambales Military District and directed the activities of 10,000 guerrillas against the Japanese. His base of operations was near Mount Pinatubo, the dominant peak in Zambales Province.⁷ The guerrillas under Magsaysay were so efficient that the Japanese put a price on the commander's head. His leadership was

⁴Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 207.

⁵Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 119.

⁶Ibid., p. 121.

⁷Osanka, loc. cit.

complimented by his boldness in the face of adversity. "Once he disguised himself as a Japanese and walked into a Japanese Army post at Lugaen to borrow a cigarette."⁸

There were many guerrilla forces operating on the Philippines during the war. Many were under Hukbalahap leadership who refused to fight under the direction of General Douglas Mac Arthur's General Headquarters unless it suited their purpose. Magsaysay's force did receive guidance, support and direction from G.H.Q. The allied war effort progressed favorably, to a large extent, due to the assistance of these guerrillas operating within the Japanese occupied country.

One of the greatest contributions made by Captain Magsaysay and his forces was his assistance in facilitating the American invasion of the coast of Luzon. On January 29, 1945, elements of the 149th Infantry, 38th Infantry Division landed near Subic Bay, ready for an extensive engagement but found instead that Captain Magsaysay and his troops had cleared the area of all Japanese three days prior to the landing. This action facilitated the more extensive action by XI Corps in securing the Island of Luzon.⁹ General Mac Arthur heard about the operation and a month later Captain Magsaysay was appointed to the position of Military Governor of Zambales Province. A year later, in May 1946, having advanced to the rank of Major, Magsaysay resigned his post to enter private business. He then turned over an efficient organization and operation to the government thus ending more than four years of military service to his country. His character of service was recognized by the award of the Bronze Star for his Meritorious Service.

⁸Yvonne Roche and Evelyn Lohr, Current Biography: Who's News and Why (thirteenth edition; New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1953), p. 892.

⁹Robert R. Smith, The War in the Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines (Part of United States Army in World War II; Office of the Chief of Military History; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 313.

The Public Servant

As is the case with many citizens today, Magsaysay's plans to follow a business career were short lived for he immediately found himself in the midst of a political campaign which on April 23, 1946, saw him elected to the House of Representatives by the largest majority in the history of Zambales province. This was the beginning of a career as a public servant which was to last for some twelve years, covering the three positions of Congressman, Secretary of National Defense and President of the Republic.

Congressman from Zambales. No doubt the efficiency and fairness as a guerrilla commander and Military Governor of Zambales facilitated Magsaysay's election to Congress. He was perhaps also remembered as one who was born and raised in the province and therefore had intimate knowledge of the people and their needs and could therefore provide the representation needed.

Assuming new duties as a freshman Congressman from a predominantly rural area after a major war was not an easy task. Magsaysay took over an office in "the most spectacular pile of debris in Manila." With his secretary, or perhaps better identified as an administrative assistant, former Captain Alfonso Donte, he began to function as a representative of his people. His endless energy placed extreme demands on his secretary but the campaign pledges made to see all who came and to do everything possible to serve the people were kept. Many of his callers were veterans with problems related to compensation, benefits or other administrative matters. He grew in popularity because of his efficiency and honesty which he learned as a child, but he remained a poor man.

because he refused to avail himself to the graft and corruption which existed in the government. He also failed to take advantage of collateral free loans from the Philippine National Bank, a government owned institution because he considered it immoral for a public official to borrow money from a government institution. His poor dress also reflected this philosophy.¹⁰

Congressman Magsaysay because of his military experiences was appointed to the House Committee on National Defense where he earned a reputation not only of being fair and just in matters relative to the military but wise and knowledgeable concerning the broad matters relative to national defense. He earned the respect of his colleagues, his constituents and United States civilian and military representatives in the Philippines. His record and overall manner of performance facilitated his reelection to Congress in 1949.

The insurgency problem in the Philippines had developed to a point by 1950 where the entire situation seemed hopeless indeed. Citizens were being subjected to terror, large land areas were under Hukbalahap control, citizens had lost faith in the government and in general an extreme crisis existed.

In April 1950, President Quirino selected Magsaysay, then Chairman of the Committee on National Defense, to go to Washington, D. C., to request additional military aid under the provisions of the Military Assistance Agreement of March, 1947. The request was far in excess of that which the United States was prepared to provide; however, Magsaysay was well respected in the Pentagon and the White House and was

¹⁰Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, pp. 85-91.

successful in his mission. The Philippines thereupon received forty-seven million dollars in military aid as compared with twenty million dollars during the previous five years.¹¹

The insurgency crisis continued to mount with no end in sight. The Quirino Administration seemed unable to address the problem to any degree. Secretary of National Defense Ruperto Kanglcon had been unsuccessful in his efforts to secure Administration support for reforms in the military including the drastic step of removing certain key military figures in high command positions. Kanglcon, in a state of frustration, then tendered his resignation.¹²

The absence of a leader in the Defense Department further compounded the problem of prosecuting the insurgent war. Because of his familiarity with the Defense Department and his previous military service, many prominent officials urged the President to appoint Magsaysay to the vacated position. Notable among those supporting such an appointment were Major General Leland Hobbs, Chief of the Joint U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group and formerly a staff officer in General Mac Arthur's GHQ, with intimate knowledge of Magsaysay's manner of performance as a guerrilla leader and Governor of Zambales Province; and Senator Tomas Cabili, a prominent political leader.¹³ President Quirino asked Magsaysay to accept the position a total of three times. Magsaysay delayed his response until he could accomplish two basic tasks. First, a basic plan for dealing with the Nuk problem was prepared for presentation to the President for consideration as a prelude, if not a

¹¹ Frank H. Golay, The Philippines Public Policy and National Economic Development (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 82.

¹² Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 122.

¹³ Ibid., p. 123.

condition for acceptance. Second, a visit was made to United States Ambassador Myron Cowen to ascertain if he would support the appointment. He did so with pleasure. Magsaysay then visited President Quirino and presented his "internal defense" plan for consideration. The plan was to say the least, different and unique as seen in the following exchange between President Quirino and Magsaysay:

I have never heard of those tactics. General Costanedo (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines) has never suggested anything like this to me. Of course not (replied Magsaysay), Costanedo does not know anything about guerrilla warfare. He does not understand the kind of strategy that has to be practiced against the Huks if we are to defeat them.¹⁴

The meeting culminated in the acceptance of a new unique approach to defeating the Huks by the President and the appointment of Magsaysay as the new Secretary of National Defense. Magsaysay subsequently resigned his position of Representative from Zambales Province and assumed his new duties on September 1, 1950.

Secretary of National Defense. Upon assuming the duties of a Cabinet member, Ramon Magsaysay looked to the President for guidance relative to the authority and the degree to which he could act. Having previously secured approval to employ his "unique" strategy, his additional guidance was simply - "restore faith in the government and defeat the H.U.¹⁵

Realizing that the previous Secretary of National Defense had resigned, having been unable to convince the President to employ "unconventional tactics" against an unconventional enemy, Magsaysay knew that his

¹⁴Romula, The Magsaysay Story, p. 105.

¹⁵Arthur Campbell, Guerilla, A History and Analysis (New York: The John Day Company, 1968), p. 129.

job would not be easy. He knew that with professional competence and reasonable support from the President, that progress would be made.

As any new supervisor would, upon assuming a new position, Nagosay made an in depth study of the anti-Huk effort. He also went beyond this and examined the organization of the military forces, both Regular Army and Constabulary, being employed in the fight. He likewise examined the factors which influenced average citizens to become guerrillas. Although some aspects of the findings and the psychological implications and actions will be covered in Chapter VI, it will be pointed out at this time that there was evidence of corruption in government, many social ills in the country, particularly the living and working conditions of the peasant (tenant) farmers in the barrios, and a need for further reorganization in the armed forces. There was also the evidence that some action had been tried to an extent in the nature of "radical" approaches to the problem of social ills and reformation. Notable among these were three basic programs which although not completely effective, offered some hope for success. They included 1) President Quirino's action in 1948 creating an amnesty program for insurgents. The failure of this program was due to the fact that the program was not accompanied by tangible evidence of government action to rid itself of corruption and graft, and no action to remove the discontentment of the people. 2) In 1950, President Quirino organized neighborhood or barangay associations for mutual protection purposes and to provide assistance to the armed forces, and 3) lastly, an effective program to clear the government of corruption by the creation of an "Integrity Board." Concurrently action was taken to relieve the Constabulary of its

peace and order campaign because of their abuse of the people.¹⁶

The above limited findings served as background for some of the positive actions taken by Magsaysay. With respect to his own personal honesty and integrity, few if any could doubt that it was above reproach. He drove a 1947 Model car, lived on his government salary of \$500.00 per month and a small fee which he received as Chairman of the Board of Philippine Airlines.¹⁷

The action which followed the "estimate of the situation" was broad, sweeping and effective. When faced with an incident in which a frustrated leader was organizing a revolt against the government, Magsaysay stated with honesty and sincerity and confidence: "Give me ninety days. If I haven't done anything by then, go ahead. I promise you." In exactly eighty-three days, three generals including the head of the Constabulary and the Army had been relieved. In addition, other "arm chair" type ineffectuals had been discharged or demoted for inefficiency.¹⁸

The numerous other actions demonstrated that promises to a disenchanted people can be kept and that the needs of the people can be met. As positive effort was demonstrated, confidence in the government grew. In a display of this growing confidence, with the urging of Magsaysay, \$500,000 was contributed by businessmen and land owners from which to pay rewards for information on the guerrillas. This would have been impossible in prior years.

¹⁶ Bacagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign, p. 179.

¹⁷ William L. Warden, "Robin Hood of the Islands," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXIV (January 12, 1952), p. 76.

¹⁸ Ibid.

The Defense Department at this time was located in downtown Manila, a location which made it accessible and susceptible to political influence. This problem was solved simply and with dispatch when the new Secretary moved the entire department to Camp Murphy in the suburbs.

Reform did not occur only in the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The entire establishment was reorganized; the Constabulary-Army integration was completed and action was taken to improve the lot of the individual soldiers, airmen and sailors. This included better leadership, discipline, facilities and food. Lectures were conducted on the errors of Marxism and in general, things began to move. In spite of this, money was still the key to continued social improvement and the internal defense efforts. Magsaysay urged President Quirino to send Carlos P. Romulo then Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Washington to seek financial assistance. This was done and Romulo met with Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, who wired General Hobbs in Manila to return to Washington for consultations. General Hobbs backed up Romulo's demands. The problem of the insurgency and the financial request was placed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council and President Truman. The result was that ten million dollars was taken from the Defense Department and given to Magsaysay with full confidence that all of it would be honestly spent.¹⁹

One of the major achievements which had psychological effects on the enemy but more importantly, one which helped to restore the confidence of the people in the government, was the supervision of the elections of 1951. The Philippines had been noted for dishonesty at the polls. Some elections had seen open violations of election laws, reprisals and out

¹⁹Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 123.

right hoodlum actions. Terrorism had also been employed to discourage the exercise of the vote. This was particularly true during the elections of 1949. President Quirino appointed his Defense Secretary to supervise and secure the polling places. His action was in keeping with his other displays of efficiency. In one town where a pre-election killing occurred, Magsaysay ordered the entire police force arrested and charged with murder. In another town, a candidate was kidnapped. The mayor was promptly jailed. Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) cadets were used to "secure the polls" while other military forces were used as a reaction force. In addition, Major General Robert Cannon, the JUSMAAG Commander, sprinkled twenty-five officers around the polls as observers. The foreign correspondents dispersed throughout the islands also assisted in protecting the people. As a result, hired gunmen began to return their guns to their political bosses and left the area. The result was that four million Filipinos voted in complete safety.²⁰

After a year in office, the insurgency began to show definite signs of improvement. In fact, for the first time, government forces were on the offensive rather than just reacting to a Huk operation. The relative success at this point in his tenure as Defense Secretary suggested that some efforts should be made to influence the minds of the people and to improve the lot of those who were in need. Again, the psychological aspects of this action will be covered in Chapter VI; however, it should be pointed out at this time that those efforts in the domestic area were among the most notable of the period. Secretary Magsaysay established the human relations bureaus which provided a vehicle for the exchange of information and an opportunity to see the

²⁰Ibid., p. 142.

problems of the people. The one most common thing which was consistently identified as a major factor in the problems of the people was land. It provided a theme for the communists -- "land for the landless" and it was a source of irritation to the people in that they worked the land but the land owners profited. This problem resulted in the birth of the Economic Development Corps (ELCOR) which took large unclaimed and undeveloped wastelands in Mindanao and converted it into useful tracts on which ex-Huks were settled. Each family was provided with six hectares of lands, a carabao, loans to purchase tools and provisions for future ownership of the land. Schools, roads, recreation facilities and other amenities were provided under Army supervision. This overall project was a success in spite of the failure of a previous organization, the Land Settlement Development Corps (LASEDECO) which was inept, inefficient and politically influenced.

In connection with the resettlement project, there was a need for buildings of all kinds. One local political figure had a yard full of quonset buildings which he had acquired and was holding for a better price under the inflated economy. These buildings were needed for schools and efforts by officials to secure them had failed. Secretary Magsaysay rounded up a few of his former guerrillas, raided the "supply dump" and took 140 of the quonsets. He later paid the owner what he knew to be the price paid for them - twenty-five cents (\$0.25) each.²¹

With confidence in the government continuing, a need for additional financial assistance from the United States was apparent. Secretary Magsaysay was selected to make the trip to Washington. He arrived in the Capitol City on June 11, 1952, for a five-day visit. He was met at MATS (now MAC or Military Airlift Command) Terminal by Secretary of

²¹ibid., pp. 151-154.

the Army Frank Pace, Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. The visit to Washington included a luncheon date on June 12 with Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, a call on President Harry S. Truman, an address before members of the State Department, a news conference at the Philippine Embassy and a visit to New York. Complete coverage of this event by the New York Times throughout the five-day visit was indicative of the esteem in which the patriot was held by the United States in official and private quarters. The visit resulted in assistance in the amount of \$100,000,000.²² This accomplished the official mission of the visit; however, from a more personal point of view and a highlight of the occasion was when Secretary of the Army Frank Pace presented Magsaysay with the Legion of Merit with the rank of Commander for "exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service."²³ This award was made under Department of the Army General Orders 64, of June 30, 1952 (Figure 9).

Secretary Magsaysay continued to prosecute the war with relative freedom but his efforts to interest the government in social reform often met with resistance from President Quirino. Social, fiscal and land reform were considered major aspects of Magsaysay's anti-guerrilla and PSYOP campaign. Though not so stated in any references consulted, perhaps the President felt that those areas were not within the province of the Defense Secretary or perhaps he felt overshadowed by a member of his Cabinet. On February 28, 1953, Ramon Magsaysay resigned his position, feeling that he could no longer do his job without the support of the President. This brought to a conclusion, twenty-nine months of duty in

²²News items in the New York Times, June 11-16, 1952.

²³Rothe and Lohr, Current Biography, p. 193.

GENERAL ORDERS)
No. 64)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington 25, D. C., 30 June 1952
Section

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* * * * *

V. LEGION OF MERIT. - 1. By direction of the President, under the act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (sec. III, WD Bul. 40, 1942) and Executive Order 9260, 29 October 1942 (sec. I, WD Bul. 54, 1942), the Legion of Merit, in the Degree of Commander, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service during the periods indicated is awarded to the following-named officers:

Brigadier General Julian Nas de Ayala, Army of Uruguay, April 1951 to June 1952.

The Honorable Ramon Macsaway, Secretary of National Defense for the Republic of the Philippines. September 1950 to May 1952.

2. By direction of the President, under the act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (sec. III, WD Bul. 40, 1942) and Executive Order 9260, 29 October 1942 (sec. I, WD Bul. 54, 1942), the Legion of Merit, in the Degree of Officer, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service during the period indicated is awarded to the following-named officer:

Colonel Arif Guvenc, Army of Turkey. 27 October 1950 to June 1952.

3. By direction of the President, under the act of Congress approved 20 July 1942 (sec. III WD Bul. 40, 1942) and Executive Order 9260, 29 October 1942 (sec. I, WD Bul. 54, 1942), the Legion of Merit, in the Degree of Legionnaire, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service during the periods indicated is awarded to the following-named officers:

Colonel Dionisio S. Ojeda, Infantry, Philippine Army. 4 March to 15 September 1951.

Major Francis N. Sgourdeos, Greek Army. September 1948 to April 1952.

* * * * *

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

WM. E. BERGIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

J. LAWTON COLLINS
Chief of Staff, United States Army

which the anti-guerrilla efforts of the government were directed to a point where the people felt a state of relative security for the first time since 1948. This resignation was not by any means the end of his career of public service as there were greater things yet to be achieved by this noble patriot.

The President of the Republic. Perhaps those who knew him best could foresee Magsaysay as President, even in his early days as a freshman Congressman from an agricultural area. Perhaps some even saw a conflict between Magsaysay's efficient, honest and limitless energy and President Quirino's toleration of graft, corruption and mediocrity. This is not to say that as President, Quirino was totally inefficient; however, there is evidence to show that the lack of vision in some social, political and military areas yielded results commensurate with the effort expended.

Not only did Ramon Magsaysay resign as Secretary of Defense, he resigned from the Liberal Party. He was therefore left without an organization and political base from which to launch a campaign for the Presidency. He had the support and complete loyalty of the Armed Forces, many political personalities including Carlos P. Romulo, key Americans and most importantly, the masses of people in the country. On March 9, 1953, less than a month after he left his position and the Liberal Party, Magsaysay joined the Nationalist Party, created an organization and launched a campaign for the Presidency.

The chief theme of the campaign was of course not new to those who knew Magsaysay. He charged President Quirino with obstructing his efforts to bring the Huk rebellion to a satisfactory conclusion. He spoke out against corruption in government and efforts by persons in

high places being bribed or working in conjunction with hoodlum elements in the country. Honesty was one of his primary themes and he did not hesitate to "promise" the people that if elected he would correct many of the ills which were obvious to all but they were things which he as Secretary of Defense was unable to address due to a lack of authority.

Magsaysay was not without critics. He was said to be pro-American during his campaign. He was too close to American imperialism, according to Luis Taruc.²⁴ In this respect, the campaign was not unlike those in the United States. There was, however, a more important likeness in that the election was conducted in the relative absence of violence and open dishonesty at the election booth.

The election, held on November 10, 1953, saw 4,200,000 Filipinos cast ballots and as was expected, Magsaysay won in a landslide victory with a vote of 2,890,401 to 1,292,395.

The Inauguration of Magsaysay as the third President of the Republic on December 30, 1953, was considered by some to be the most unorthodox ceremony in recent years. The President-elect wore slacks and a short sleeve shirt while President Quirino was formally dressed. In typical fashion for one who was of the people, Magsaysay beamed with joy, shook hands and declared that the government would be judged by deeds, not words. So enthusiastic was the response of the people that they literally tore the clothes off the new President. His trousers were saved by the aid of two safety pins which he had installed prior to the ceremony for just such an emergency. Magsaysay had advised the domestic staff at the Malacanan Palace, the official residence of the President,

²⁴ Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 283.

to prepare dinner for a few dozen guests. They played it safe and prepared for five hundred. More than five thousand came and literally cleaned out the kitchen, eating all that was available.

Although he was elected as President, Ramon Magsaysay continued as his own Secretary of National Defense, the position he had held for three years prior to his election. In this capacity and with full powers as President, the policies which were initiated and those which could not be achieved due to Presidential decisions were initiated and supported.

It is pointed out at this time that the back of the Huk insurgents had been broken but the movement was by no means eliminated. The Hukbalahap leader Luis Taruc had yet to be captured and many of his followers were still active. The capture of Taruc was a necessity and continued efforts in the area of social and economic reform had to be made. Luis Taruc surrendered on May 15, 1954, less than six months after Magsaysay took office. The details of this event will be covered in Chapter VI; however, it is important to recognize the psychological victory achieved when the leader of the insurgents was brought into the hands of the government.

Agrarian reform continued and small farmers were for the first time able to secure title to lands which their relatives had worked for many generations. This was accomplished under the provisions of Republic Act Number 1400 of September 9, 1955. Establishment and support of resettlement actions which had begun during the years as Secretary of Defense continued with full Presidential support with the positive results which were foreseen.²⁵

Magsaysay also worked toward getting the government out of entrepreneurial activities. This included disposition of government

owned manufacturing plants and a host of other money making operations. He also increased the availability of jobs, instituted far-reaching changes in military policy and throughout the government, insisted on the complete honesty of those in public office.²⁶

As was his practice while Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay often found himself moving about the country in response to a particular need of his people. He traveled from island to island and village to village. Where possible he used the Presidential plane, a C-47 (DC-3) for his island hops. The silver plane was name "The Mount Pinatubo" which was painted across the fusilage in white script. The names comes from the dominant peak in Zambales Province where Magsaysay had commanded the guerrillas during the Japanese occupation.

Like many world renown personalities, President Magsaysay was unable to witness the completion of his program, for his life came to an abrupt end when the Mount Pinatubo struck a 3,000 foot mountain on March 17, 1957. The President had gone to Cebu City to deliver an address. The plane made a normal take off from the Cebu City Airport in the early morning hours of March 17. It later returned for emergency repairs. When again airborne, a message was transmitted to Malacanan Palace tower at 1:17 that morning to have the official sedan at Nichols Field at 3:15 a.m. for the President's arrival. The last transmission received from the plane was - "at 4,000 feet, climbing to 9,000 - ceiling unlimited." The wreckage was found late on March 17 twenty-two miles northwest of Cebu City. Of the twenty-six persons aboard the plane, including Education Secretary Gregorio Hernandez, Jr.; General Benito E.

²⁶Ibid., p. 227.

Buen, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; two Presidential aides and a number of others; only one person survived. He was Nestor Mata, a newsman with the entourage. He received severe burns and other injuries.²⁷

The loss of Ramon Magsaysay to the country he loved so much was great. He was "the symbol of a nation's pride."²⁸ His brilliant, effective and somewhat unorthodox methods brought to a "conclusion" an insurgency which had plagued the Philippines and tormented Presidents for more than eight years.

A place among the truly great was reserved for Ramon Magsaysay upon his death. Although only forty-five years of age on that dark day, he had made more contributions to his country and the free world than many public servants twice his age. The integrity of this man can best be reflected in a statement uttered in official circles in Manila -- "everyone has his price but Magsaysay." He was in no sense a typical Philippines politician. He was not a lawyer, he had no Spanish or Chinese blood but rather was a pure Malayan. He looked and acted like a leader and above all was esteemed for his honesty.²⁹

27 "The Passing of a Friend," Newsweek, XLIX (March 25, 1957), p. 52.

28 Ibid.

29 Sanger, Insurgent Era, p. 135.

CHAPTER VI

PSYOP AND THE NEW HORIZON

In the preceding chapters, the problems facing the Philippine Republic, the personality of a dedicated leader and an introductory treatment of insurgency have been addressed. With the exception of the treatment of Ramon Magsaysay, those chapters addressed the problem of the condition. The crux of this research is the cause and response. As presented in this paper, the chapter on the person of Ramon Magsaysay was to be sure, part of the response. He did in fact influence, through his actions and his life, the hearts and minds of his fellow countrymen.

Earlier in this paper, psychological operations was defined as "the planned use of communications (or propaganda) through words, symbols and actions to influence the behavior of people." Ramon Magsaysay was a living example of this in that he did, without a doubt, influence people. This premise can be documented in the words of Szunyough that "propaganda is not only the written or spoken word but all actions and behavior which influence the mentality or attitude of other people."¹ In this respect, upon his appointment as Defense Secretary, Magsaysay's "unique PSYOP" campaign against the Hukbalahap was a priori to the launching of the physical campaign.

Armed only with a mandate to "restore the confidence of the people in the government" the new Defense Secretary assumed his new duties. The

¹Szunyough, Psychological Warfare, p. 41.

following accounts fully document his performance of duty as he directed the internal defense efforts of his country.

The Evaluation

When undertaking a campaign against an adversary in a military, social or perhaps an athletic contest, a wise competitor first makes an appraisal or an in depth study. Perhaps those in the military would elect to label the event as an estimate of the situation. The tenure of Ramon Magsaysay as Defense Chief had a similar beginning. A complete internal defense estimate was made prior to acting decisively against the insurgency. This estimate was made after examination and evaluation of all available data. It was not, however, made in a vacuum in that the new Secretary had detailed knowledge of the problem prior to assuming the position. It was rather made with an open mind, with a full knowledge that only with objective evaluation could the internal defense problem in that country be properly addressed.

Having fully examined the problem facing his country, Secretary Magsaysay found, among many other things that in general:

- 1) The Communist guerrilla movement was effective where the people considered themselves among the disaffected.
- 2) The question of the ownership of land was a sore point with most of the peasants.
- 3) Many villagers considered the government soldiers as despicable as the guerrillas due to their misbehavior and pillage in the villages.
- 4) Many villagers supported the insurgents as a self-protection measure.

5) Some military commanders made little efforts to fight the Huks.

6) People may be less prone to rebellion if the economy is improving, providing them with a rising level of expectations.

7) The bulk of the membership of the insurgents consisted of peasants and workers.²

Each of the facts listed above had to be used as a basis for the anti-guerrilla campaign. They suggested beyond reasonable doubt that the war against the insurgents should of necessity be directed toward their minds rather than their bodies. To do this, a basic understanding of people must be developed and particularly the Filipino people, their beliefs, values, aspirations and capabilities.

The Philippine Department of National Defense suggests that Filipinos believe in the following:

1) Principles

- a. The individual is the cornerstone of our society.
- b. All men are created equal.
- c. Every man is entitled to freedom and the pursuit of happiness.

2) Rights

- a. Right to Life
- b. Right to Liberty
- c. Right to Own Private Property
- d. Right to Personal Security
- e. Right to Free Assembly
- f. Right to Freedom of Worship
- g. Right to Freedom of Expression
- h. Right to Vote
- i. Right to Petition the Government
- j. Right to a Fair Hearing

3) Limitations

- a. The rights of an individual should not infringe the rights of another.
- b. Individual rights should not infringe on the welfare of the whole.

²Melnar, Human Factors Considerations, pp. 72-74.

c. Individual rights should be guided by laws.

4) Norms of Conduct

- a. Every man is judged by his own record.
- b. A man is free to improve himself through honest work.
- c. The community should look after those who can not provide for their security.
- d. Individuals should deal fairly with one another.
- e. Cooperation and competition should be practiced fairly.

5) Responsibilities

- a. Individuals are responsible for themselves and their families.
- b. The individual is responsible to the community.
- c. The individual is responsible to the world.³

The third ingredient in the evaluation was the military itself.

The findings here were not surprising since Magsaysay was an experienced soldier and former member of the powerful Armed Services committee. The findings established, to list only a few major items that:

1. The Army was basically organized to conduct conventional warfare.
2. Many commanders rarely prosecuted the war against the Huks.
3. There was wide-spread gambling among both officers and troops.
4. Many offenses, including rape, assault, pillage and other serious crimes were being perpetrated by members of the military establishment.
5. Discipline in many instances was almost non-existent.⁴

Finally, some insight into the character of the guerrilla movement and its support base had to be discerned. If the government represents law and order, the symbol of the nation and indeed the side of that which

³Philippines Department of National Defense, Civil Affairs Office, Primer for Filipinos, What We Filipinos Believe In (Manila: Government Printing Office).

⁴Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 127.

is right, why then did the people support a movement which was on the side of the wrong? Where had the duly elected government, representative of the people, failed in their duty to the people ~~for~~ whom it was created to serve? In seeking further answers to those perplexing questions, it was found that:

1. Many high government officials had allowed themselves to drift into a state of inefficiency and corruption, and a failure to institute social and economic reforms so vitally needed to lift the burden of poverty from the shoulders of the peasant; and because past policies had allowed the masses to feel that the government was not interested in them while the Communists were.⁵
2. Insurgency requires the employment of a mixture of psychological, political, ideological socioeconomic and military operations based on an organization which includes military and civilian personnel who may not be party members or believers in the Communist ideology.⁶
3. The main guerrilla strength was found in the very lack of military formality. In many cases, they were peasant farmers by day and guerrilla fighters by night.⁷

The above major findings are by no means all inclusive. They are rather the major areas which dictated that the campaign against the insurgents must of necessity be based on a psychological campaign before, during and after the military operations. Psychological operations would have to be accepted by the government and the military leaders as a primary weapons system. It is not an ultimate weapon or end in itself but

⁵Campbell, Guerilla, A History and Analysis, p. 129.

⁶Bjelajac, Guidelines for Measuring Success, pp. 657-659.

⁷Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 6.

if its use is planned and if effectively employed, PSYOP can and has been most effective as a vehicle in a collateral capacity in internal defense efforts.

The Reformation

It is an accepted fact that few people who do wrong influence others to do right. Hypocrisy in the Armed Forces had to be eliminated before any efforts could be undertaken against the Huks. Reform within the military was the logical step to take as a prelude to an all out effort against the insurgents.

The first step toward reform within the military was to incorporate the Constabulary into the 18,000 man army.⁸ As pointed out in Chapter IV, this action, which was approved during the tenure of the previous Defense Secretary, eliminated an autonomous force and provided single leadership and control of all of the armed forces of the nation. Next, directives were published indicating very clearly that any member of the forces who commits assault, rape or other crimes against the public would be promptly and severely disciplined. This was not meant to be a threat but rather it served notice of the consequences of failure to obey the laws of the country and the military code as many soon came to realize after being convicted and sentenced to severe punishments.

On numerous occasions, the Defense Secretary visited military bases in isolated parts of the country on an unannounced basis to check on the effectiveness of operations and compliance with orders by local commanders. On one occasion, Romulo records that Magsaysay found a gate guard asleep upon his arrival. He quietly relieved the guard of his weapon and sent his aide to find the Commanding Officer and ask him to

⁸Daugherty, et al., A Psychological Warfare Casetbook, p. 171.

join the Secretary at the scene. In the commander's presence, the guard was awakened and immediately disciplined. The commander was promptly relieved.

Efforts to improve and reform the military made no exceptions for rank, position or tenure of service. If one did his job, he was rewarded. If he did not, he was promptly and effectively disciplined. The most severe example of the application of this policy of reform was reflected in Magsaysay's action to relieve the Army Chief of Staff. President Quirino objected to this strong action but finally capitulated when Magsaysay insisted. He firmly believed that "the Army is no place for Hooligans. Your uniform is the symbol of our national sovereignty and you must treat it with respect and see that it is respected."⁹

The reform did not end with the above actions. Orders were issued prohibiting gambling by anyone in the armed forces. This ruling resulted in the downfall of many senior and not so senior military men.

One of the most classic incidents in the campaign to eliminate inefficiency, indifference and lethargy occurred on a visit to a military post. The Defense Secretary on noting that a unit was not prosecuting the war against the Huks asked the commander how long it would take the unit to move to the field. The commander's response was "approximately two weeks." With little compassion, Magsaysay directed that the unit move in exactly three hours. At the end of three hours the unit was enroute to the field to do the job for which they were organized.

With respect to organization, the elimination of numerous service and administrative units was considered an absolute necessity. Many of these units were left over from World War II with no real

⁹Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 127.

mission, yet no action had been taken to reorganize them. The type of conflict in which the Army was engaged required small, light, mobile units, capable of fast reaction to the character of guerrilla warfare. With this in mind, a total of twenty-six Battalion Combat Teams (BCT) were created. The combat portion of the unit included three rifle companies, a heavy weapons company, a battery of artillery and a reconnaissance company. The combat service support elements included a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Service Company, an Intelligence Section, Psychological Warfare Section, and a Medical and Dental Detachment. This new organization totaled 1007 officers and men and provided the necessary firepower, eliminated unnecessary service elements and thus added an element of light mobility not previously available. It should be noted with particular interest that PSYOP was to be emphasized by the addition of an operational psychological warfare element.¹⁰

The military was not only reorganized physically, but the entire establishment was organized into a "public relations outfit with every officer and every soldier under orders to win public esteem."¹¹

With the above examples of reform in the military, the relative combat power for the first time appeared to be shifting to the side of the government. In all of his efforts and measures to improve the image and quality of the military, stern though many of them were, the new young Secretary restored morale, discipline and efficiency to the Armed Forces and made them an effective fighting force. In so doing he restored the respect and confidence which the people previously had for their military and also made giant steps toward restoring respect for the

¹⁰Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 196.

¹¹Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 126.

government which was part of the guidance previously given by the President.¹²

The Psychological Operations Campaign

The finalization of the plan of attack was accomplished by the Defense Secretary after all of his estimates were completed. His basic decision was to wage a psychological campaign against five target groups. These included the guerrillas, the sympathizers, those citizens loyal to the government, the political leaders of the insurgency movement and those in the government whose activities or inactivity contributed to the cause of the enemy. The psychological campaign would be strategic, involving the entire government, with long range objectives, as well as those actions of a tactical nature, employed at unit level in the military which implemented broad policy.

Military operations would continue but would be based on intelligence and a military response appropriate to the specific tactical situation. In addition, offensive action would be waged with extensive patrol action by light mobile units. The plan in short would be based on the "fist of all-out force and the hand of all-out friendship."¹³ To a large extent, the decision was with the insurgents as to which response they received.

This 'new' idea would probably be rejected by many skeptics, particularly the conventionally thinking, conservative military leaders as well as those in the government. In truth, psychological warfare is not new in that many examples of its use can be found in the pages of history,

¹²United States Department of Defense, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, Background, Republic of the Philippines (DA Pamphlet 355-130) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 7.

¹³Thayor, Guerrilla, p. 30.

as early as the days of the Old Testament. The Seventh Chapter of the Book of Judges records the use of panic by Gideon in his fight against the Midianites. The conquests of Ghengus Kahn whose successes were based on the weight of sheer numbers is an early example of psychological operations. As early as 4,000 years before the birth of Christ, there is evidence of psychological warfare in the form of a war of nerves which was directed against the city of Aratta by the Lord of the City of Erech.

In spite of the examples from early history and others from more recent years, Secretary Magsaysay in providing guidance and direction to his generals explained that the war involved part physical and part moral causes, as Clausewitz pointed out; that people who feel themselves pushed or left out will react in a manner which to them appears to be in their best interest. It should therefore be understood that the government response should not take the form of conventional approaches against an enemy which is not fighting a conventional war.

With respect to the military campaign, Magsaysay set the tone of his unique strategy in the following comment to the General Staff:

Gentlemen, I know you have all graduated from military establishments here and in the United States. Now I am telling you, I want you to forget everything you were taught at Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Benning and the Academy. The Huks are fighting an unorthodox war. We are going to combat them in unorthodox ways. Whatever it was that hurt me the most as a guerrilla is what we are going to do now to the Huks.¹⁴

The guidance to the General Staff included the entire operations plan which included strategic and tactical PSYOP, improved intelligence, military PSYOP integration and civilian cooperation in support of the war effort. These areas are examined in the pages which follow.

Strategic PSYOP. Having decided upon a psychological campaign, plans were made for the total integration of the program at all echelons

¹⁴Romulo. The Magsaysay Story, p. 112.

from the President to the military and the citizens. It was realized that psychological operations must be the projection of national policy which was not in the province of the Defense Department to unilaterally create. To emphasize the importance of PSYOP and to supervise the over-all activities of the program, a new agency in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was created. It was called the Public Affairs Office (PAO). This agency, in addition to planning and supervision, provided direction to PSYOP teams which were organized and employed in troop units.¹⁵

Once organized and functioning, planning for the communications to the various target audiences were refined. They included those to the general public in order to gain and maintain their support for the internal defense effort and the Armed Forces so as to reinforce their loyalty and induce them to military excellence. The enemy was of course the first and foremost object of the PSYOP effort. He was to be defeated or induced to surrender by the application of propaganda and other psychological communications. If successful, the seeds of victory could have been planted without the application of combat power.

The theme around which the psychological campaign was centered was all out war or all out friendship. It was to be repeated over and over through all available communications media. The radio and newspapers were the most effective and available media for employment in the Philippines at that time and it was used to the fullest extent possible. In the barrios particularly, and to some extent in urban areas, the bulletin board was extensively used. This ancient medium was instigated by Julius Caesar in 60 B.C. but was selected as one to be employed

¹⁵Baclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign, p. 182.

against the Huk's because of its simplicity, low cost and appeal. Books, rallies, magazines and drama were also used in the program. The information or propaganda was by direction always as credible as possible in keeping with the Defense Secretary's philosophy of honesty. In addition to these vehicles, one of the most effective and credible of media often used was the personal credible words of Magsaysay--"I promise," which he often used when petitioned in face to face encounters with his fellow citizens.

To assist the public affairs office in its PSYOP efforts, the United States Information Service (the overseas element of the United States Information Agency) offered its services to the government. The assistance rendered had a profound influence on the effectiveness of the PSYOP program in the Philippines.¹⁶

With effective direction and coordination at Defense Department level in being and functioning, it could be seen that a coordinator at unit level was a necessity. This need resulted in the creation of a staff officer position in each unit (ECT) to supervise the war of words at the grass roots level where contact with guerrillas and supporters is most likely to occur.

Having accomplished the above, the most difficult phase had to be addressed. That was the removal of the social conditions which cause men to defect or lose confidence in their government and seek a panacea. The most pressing problem in the barrios where the Huk problem was most pronounced, was the problem of land ownership. This is the age old problem of absentee landlords and poor hapless workers who received little for their efforts. This practice dated back to the 17th century.

¹⁶Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. 371.

Magsaysay proclaimed the government's answer when he asked, "why do you fight? For land of your own? Well then you can quit fighting because I'll give you land. You can have a house in a village with electricity, a school, fifteen acres and a carabao. The government will give it to you--I promise."¹⁷ He was of course speaking of the resettlement program commonly called the EDCOR (Economic Development Corps) program which was created in February 1952 at Kapatagan and supervised by the Army. With four million pesos provided by the government and a large area of fertile but undeveloped land on Mindanao, the program was initiated. Provisions were made for a modest, not so fancy but comfortable home (Figure 10) safe water, drainage, sewerage disposal, schools, churches and other facilities and institutions. Assistance was in order to get the settler started on his initial crop through the loan of tools, seed and other necessities. Provisions were also made for the complete ownership of the land on which the settler worked after an agreed upon period of time. Of all of those settled, starting in 1952, none had returned to the Communist camp by 1958.

Not all Huks were immediately given land and sent to settlement villages. Assistance was given on the basis of need, debts to society and other factors which included:

1. Those Huks serving sentences were given vocational training concurrently.
2. Magsaysay secured an appropriation from Congress from which loans to start small businesses could be secured.
3. The government sponsored a rural rehabilitation program which included artesian wells, irrigation and other betterment projects.¹⁸

¹⁷ Warden, "Robin Hood of the Islands," p. 26.

¹⁸ William O. Douglas, "Asia, 1952," Look XV (November 4, 1952), 25-31.




Figure 10. Magsaysay Visits ECCOR Village
(From Time, July 2, 1951).

The EDCOR program which is more properly identified as an internal development program was needless to say one of the most successful and provided excellent material for the entire PSYOP effort. As a result, hundreds of Iuks surrendered saying Quid Pro Quo - I want my farm.

Intelligence. Even in today's modern armed forces, the one indispensable requirement for success in battle is good intelligence, both combat and strategic. Intelligence is the basis for the proper application of combat power at the appropriate time and place in a decisive manner. In internal defense operations as in conventional actions, it is the result of collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of information from all available sources. It is a painstaking process of placing pieces together from a variety of sources until a composite whole, as in a mosaic, is created.

Intelligence, to be effective must come from a variety of sources. Professional intelligence agents are a minor source of the vast amount of information required to effectively prosecute an insurgency. This means therefore that the bulk of the information contributed must come from ordinary citizens in all walks of life. Housewives, government employees, farmers, merchants and even children often provide valuable data for the intelligence picture. "To best the enemy on his own ground, the first essential is knowledge--knowledge about the enemy himself, his methods, strengths, weaknesses, tactics and techniques."¹⁹

The assistance of the public in the process of intelligence gathering was generated as a result of psychological operations efforts directed toward that target group. Systems for reporting enemy activity

¹⁹T. M. Green (ed.), The Guerrillas and How to Fight Him (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. v.

ranged from the very simple to the most sophisticated. One of the most effective psychological weapons used against the Hukks and their sympathizers was the now famous leaflet of "the eye." This simple leaflet (Figure 11) simply showed an eye and the words "you are being watched." This one item created a climate of suspicion among the insurgents toward each other, not knowing who the "spy" was or even if there was a spy. This leaflet was originally used against a school teacher who was suspected of collaboration with the insurgents. Another most effective means of conveying information was that used by farmers who were loyal to the government. It involved placing farm implements in a prearranged manner so as to indicate the size, location and type of enemy activity if any when observed by the farmer (Figure 12). This information was received by spotter aircraft and relayed to the appropriate ground headquarters for action.²⁰

Magsaysay made provisions for and encouraged citizens to communicate directly with him and as usual the reply was "I promise" to take action. Those who had no money for telegrams were encouraged to send information by "collect" telegrams. A system of rewards was also instituted to provide an inducement for more information.

The collection of information from various sources does not in itself insure that intelligence is generated. Secretary Magsaysay realized that improved intelligence was generated when weaknesses were identified and the system improved. The following are weaknesses which were eliminated in the intelligence community in the Armed Forces of the Philippines:

²⁰A. H. Peterson *et al.* (ed.), Symposium on the Role of Air Power in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine Huk Campaign (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963), p. 50.





Figure 11. The Eye—You Are Being Watched.

(From A. H. Peterson et al (ed) Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counter Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine Huk Campaign. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963. p. 51.)



Message.

Enemy concentration at 330°, 200, active

Direction: plow. Strength: 2 haystacks.

Disposition: open gate

Figure 12. Ground Spotter's Farm.

(From A. H. Peterson et al (ed), *Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counter Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine Huk Campaign*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963, p. 41.)

1. Unsystematic and inefficient collection of information.
2. Defective procedures of interrogation.
3. Poor evaluation of information taken from interrogators and documents.
4. Defective system for disseminating intelligence . . .
5. Lack of appreciation of time and space factors.
6. Too much emphasis on pre-operations intelligence and too little on post.²¹

In keeping with Magsaysay's plan to defeat the Huks on his own terms, a spy school was established in the hills to train agents. Soldiers were often dressed as women on specific assignments and intelligence collection became one of the major tasks of military units in the normal course of their performance of duty.

Secretary Magsaysay was fortunate in that for seemingly no clear reason, people came forward with information or plans to assist in the war effort. David Jones (Figure 13), an American Negro, ex-soldier was in Manila and for a silly bet which he made with a friend became a spy against the Huks. He was a radio operator and felt that he had a skill to offer the Huks. He prepared the way by letting the word get around that he wanted to get where the action was. He also planted stories that he was wanted by the police for smuggling. To cap the story, arrangements were made by Magsaysay to search Jones' room in full view of the Huk "front man." This did the job by convincing the Huk that he (Jones) was to be trusted. After seventeen days of walking through the mountains they entered the Huk Regional Command base. Jones after some effort convinced the leaders that he was genuine and was worked into the Huk operation. After two weeks Jones convinced the leaders that he

²¹Daclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign, p. 21.




Figure 13. Ramon Magsaysay and Negro Spy David Jone (From Time, September 3, 1951).

needed to go to Manila for radio parts. When he arrived in Manila he reported the information to Nagssay whereupon six thousand soldiers converged on the RECO base camp and inflicted casualties amounting to fifty-seven buildings destroyed and one hundred Hukks killed including Perogrino and Rebecca Taruc, cousin and sister of Luis Taruc, the Huk commander. Jones, in addition to winning the \$100 bet, received \$5,000 in reward money, swore off spying and returned home to continue with his radio work.²²

Military-Psychological Operations. The object of tactical psychological operations is to provide for the integration of the psychological effort with the military offensive. Wars cannot be won by words alone but they can complement the combat operation. Further, wars are not won from garrison offices and barracks. It must be taken to the enemy in the form of offensive combat in the areas held by the enemy as revealed by effective intelligence. An insight into the contributions of PSYOP on military operations rather than a discussion of military operations per se is the basis for this portion of this paper.

Reform in the military, to include movement to the field and the development of an offensive attitude has already been addressed. The Defense Secretary made it perfectly clear that this is the duty of the military and that it would be done. To provide visual proof that enemy casualty statistics were accurate, each unit was issued a camera with which to take pictures of the results of tactical operations. This evidence was submitted with reports on enemy activities in order to

²²"The Philippines," Time, LVIII (September 3, 1951), p. 38.

validate success claims and add credibility to the PSYOP effort.

To assist the unit commander in integrating PSYOP into his operations plan, the services of a PSYOP staff officer were available. In addition, tactical psychological operations elements were attached to each Battalion Combat Team. They were organized into eight-man teams including a driver, mimeograph machine operator, typist, draftsman, artist, movie projector operator (driver), public address system operator and PSYOP specialists. The team was attached to a unit and served until no longer needed, at which time it was detached and reemployed elsewhere. The mission of the team was:

1. Effect the surrender of the guerrillas in cooperation with the unit.
2. Effect the surrender of loose fire arms in the hands of civilians.
3. To thwart a possible formation of a mass base for Huks and bandits.²³

A typical military concept, not unlike some currently being used against the Viet Cong in the Republic of Vietnam, was to cordon off an area which was infested with guerrillas. The area was then divided into sectors with a unit assigned to each and an overall control headquarters which coordinates the operation. Extensive patrolling was then instituted with an eye toward making contact with the enemy. When this is achieved, the control headquarters is notified and the reaction force is either employed as a blocking or assault force. Paratroopers or "air mobile" forces were employed where possible in the effort. Once the enemy was destroyed, the government forces consolidated its control over the area and the military force moved to the next area to be cleared.

²³Daclagon, Lessons From the Huks Campaign, p. 182.

One of the most effective uses of psychological operations in the type campaigns described above is to quickly identify the unit. When this is done the information is sent to the control headquarters which provides the name of the Huk unit commander from available files. The loud speaker plane is then dispatched over the tactical area of operation broadcasting a personal appeal to surrender using the commander's name. Information on other key personnel (vice-commander, supply officer, intelligence officer, etc.) was also provided and appeals also used their names. Another psychological approach included the use of names of key personnel with a suggestion that they betrayed their unit and provided the intelligence which resulted in the attack. The plane on departing the area periodically provided the parting words - "thank you very much, friend down there below. By your information we have been able to contact your friends. Be very careful, I hope you do not expose yourself unnecessarily." This tactic created distrust in the Huk ranks. Each was suspect, kangaroo courts were held and many of their own people were eliminated.²⁴

Magsaysay's policy continued to impress on, drive the enemy, keep him moving, employ offensive action and in general employ the basic principles of war, modified for an internal defense application. Rewards for information were likewise being emphasized. This monetary compensation was not limited to civilians. One Army captain for example, while on a military operation discovered a secret ammunition cache and was given 150,000 pesos to "forget it." He displayed honesty and professional competence by taking the money to Magsaysay who decided that the officer should be given a special expression of gratitude, rewarded on the spot

²⁴Peterson, loc. cit.

and promoted. He interrupted a State Dinner in order to have President Quirino do the honors. It was done between courses in the meal.²⁵

Although few examples are listed above, the integration of PSYOP into the military campaign facilitated a mutually supporting condominium which contributed to the overall success of the military operations conducted after the integration.

Civilian Cooperation. Although the role of the civilian in assisting the government in the prosecution of the war in the intelligence area was discussed, this should by no means suggest that providing intelligence (information from which intelligence is generated) was the only function provided.

Magsaysay took advantage of every opportunity to attend rallies, publish leaflets and deliver speeches to his fellow countrymen. This was one of his favorite ways of employing and exploiting face to face communication and to proclaim his favorite story--that he was proud to be a Filipino and that all Filipino's had reason to be proud of their country. Civilians in turn supported their government efforts by providing guides to the military, serving as agents, informers or observers. Many actively participated in military operations against the Huks. The importance of the planned PSYOP campaign toward the civilian population can thus be seen.

Cooperation with the military was generally influenced by:

1. The attitude of the civilians toward the troops.
2. The locations of the community in relation to the army stations and areas of Huk operations.

²⁵Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 139.

3. The temperament of the people.

4. The capabilities, financial and military, of the civilian communities.²⁶

Few examples of civilian cooperation were more poignant than the case of the peasant who accepted Magsaysay's standing invitation to communicate with him directly. He asked for weapons to kill a group of Hukks who had moved into his house. Magsaysay responded to the request with decisiveness and compassion by providing sleeping pills and a suggestion that they be administered in Coca-cola. With this plan, no weapons except an ax handle would be needed to do the job. A few weeks later while visiting the area, the Defense Secretary was presented with five mangled skulls as testimony to the effectiveness of the "weapons" and the guidance.²⁷

The Exposure of the Pulitburo. The war was going well but there was still the problem of the central leadership body and the leaders. This group was known as the Pulitburo. Magsaysay received a number of unexpected breaks in this connection. One came when Luis Taruc, the Communist leader gave Thomas Santiago, commonly called "Manila Boy" the assignment to kill Magsaysay. The young Huk went to Manila to carry out this mission but while enroute, like Saul (later known as the Apostle Paul) on the Damascus Road, was "converted" and became an apostle of the Secretary of Defense. He later traveled around the countryside preaching the evils of Communism. He was later introduced to Magsaysay by an ex-Huk; was told to surrender and face the charges the State had against him. This was done and the man was paroled to

²⁶ Baclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign, p. 37.

²⁷ Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 33.

Magsaysay. The intelligence which he provided was extremely valuable to the anti-Huk effort.²⁸

Two additional breaks came to the Defense Chief who had been "courting" one Mr. Rizal, son of a famous, historically prominent citizen by the name of Jose Rizal. On one occasion, Magsaysay was told to his surprise the following:

I am going to squeal on the Pulitburo. Each morning, a lady with a basket of food will come to my house to deliver meat and vegetables. When she leaves, she will go to twenty four more houses to deliver food. Follow her and you will know the names of the twenty five members of the Pulitburo.²⁹

The information was accepted and later a coordinated simultaneous raid was conducted on all of these homes by the Military Intelligence Agency and all of the leaders except one was caught. He was later shot as he attempted to escape through a rear door. The leader turned out to be a professor Jose Lava who frequently had lunch with Magsaysay. In addition to the leaders, the raid netted 42,000 pesos in cash, five truck loads of documents, jewelry, mimeograph machines, typewriters and other loot. The total cost to the government for the operation was a 6,000 peso investment for an automobile which the informer requested as part of the deal.³⁰

The big bonus came when Commander Gipana, son of the notorious Nova family and leader of the Hukbalahap on the island of Panay met Magsaysay. He was convinced to come over to the side of the government in secret, return to the island and await further orders while developing a reputation of being an extremely fierce leader. Three months later he had developed into the most feared man on Panay. Magsaysay then

²⁸Douglas, loc. cit.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

secretly visited Gipana and directed that he host a barbecue feast and extend an invitation to all of the other nineteen guerrilla commanders on the island. The leaders accepted and while at the campfire eating the "fatted calf," they were cut down by fire from government troops, thus eliminating the entire high command of an island. Following the incident, guerrillas surrendered at the rate of 5,000 per day. The total cost of the affair to the government was 400 pesos for the beef.³¹

The Surrender of Luis Taruc. By the spring of 1953, the war against the insurgents had achieved extremely favorable results. The ranks of the guerrillas were on a steady decline and their base camps were constantly moving due to the pressure being applied by government forces.

In the government proper, problems between Secretary Magsaysay and President Quirino had developed. The Secretary was a very outgoing personality who was extremely popular with the people because of his honesty, efficiency and the positive results which he achieved in prosecuting the war against the insurgents. President Quirino was a politician and was more amenable to compromise and maintaining working relationships with pressure groups, factions and perhaps maintaining the status quo. Magsaysay unable to reach an accord with his President, resigned his post as Defense Secretary on February 28, 1953, charging that it was impossible to secure additional social reforms through the President which Magsaysay felt was necessary in order to support his psychological campaign. Magsaysay being somewhat prone to employ unorthodox tactics, even outside the "system" if the system was considered an obstacle, reached a point where his progressive program for combating the Hukks had reached the end of the

road. He then ran for and was elected President on November 16, 1953. He was thus able to do as President that which he was unable to do as Secretary of National Defense. He did however retain his old position initially upon being elected President.

The successes on the field of battle and the crackdown on the Pulitburo left one major task undone--the capture of Luis Taruc, known to the Huks as "El Supremo" the commander of the insurgent forces in the field. Taruc was a long time leader in the insurgent movement. The government placed a 100,000 peso (\$50,000) price on his head before he came down from the hills during the 1948 amnesty. He remained in Manila at that time just long enough to collect his back pay as a Representative prior to returning to the hills.

While Taruc served as commander of the Huks, his first wife Enna was head nurse and supply officer of Huk GHQ. She later died on March 8, 1946 of Septicemia and diabetes. His second wife became active in the Huk movement but was killed on Good Friday, April 11, 1953 by government forces which attacked a Huk base shortly after Taruc had departed with other elements of the command. This loss to Taruc, the rebuke from the Secretariat for the recent government successes and perhaps disenchantment with Marxism set the stage for his "surrender."³²

Intelligence reports revealed that Taruc and a small group were hiding in a house in the small barrio of San Pablo, near Mount Arayat. The area was surrounded by Colonel Manuel Cobal, Columnist Benigio Aquino met with Taruc and served as an intermediary between Taruc and President Magsaysay. Taruc was ready to give himself up but wanted to

³²Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 54-121.

meet with Magsaysay and did not want the word "surrender" to be used. Magsaysay in turn wanted a surrender but refused to dignify the affair by meeting Taruc initially. The final terms of the "surrender" were:

1. Surrender by stages of all of the Huk forces and their arms.
2. Maintenance of Government Sovereignty over all parts of the country.
3. Trial for all rebels charged with crimes, with permission to enter a plea for clemency if convicted.
4. Resettlement of pardoned guerrillas on government land.

Magsaysay later agreed to omit the term "surrender" on official documents and at 2:00 a.m. May 17, 1954, he approved the terms and gave the word to bring Taruc in. The Army suspended operations between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. to facilitate the "surrender." Reporter Aquino entered the barrio and asked Taruc "do you accept the President's terms?" "I accept" was the reply.³³

After his surrender, Taruc was brought to Camp Murphy, where he met President Magsaysay in the home of General Eulogio Balao, Vice Chief of Staff. Present also was Colonel Benjamin Molina. Taruc was advised to stand trial and if convicted to allow for Executive Clemency. The trial was conducted and Taruc was given a sentence of twelve years confinement and a heavy fine. This did not end the event because the President was angered by the events and ordered a full investigation and trial on more charges. This trial lasted from mid 1955 to mid 1956 and resulted in four sentences to life imprisonment (one for each of four persons killed by Taruc). In retrospect, Taruc commented with respect to his distaste

³³Benigio Aquino, "Surrender at Barrio Santa Maria," Time LIV (May 31, 1954), p. 29.

for the word surrender; "surrender and treason are the two most derogatory words in the revolutionaries vocabulary. And yet, no be brutally honest, I surrendered. It had had enough of Polkhevism and all its works." He further acknowledged that his mother's voice on the government radio and her pleas for her son's surrender had a vast influence on his decision and was of course an outstanding example of military-psychological operations integration (and of course the essence of this entire research effort).³⁴

The Emergence of Pride and Confidence

The plan for the employment of a companion "weapons system" - PSYOP in conjunction with the military campaign proved to be a most effective and successful approach to the solution of the insurgency problem facing the Philippines. Adding to the success of the program was the immense popularity and unimpeachable honesty of the Defense Secretary, which served to unite the skeptics and other factions behind the government's internal defense efforts.

It is of course difficult to list hard statistics on the results of the conquest since as indicated earlier in this paper, the yardstick in internal defense is not necessarily ground seized or enemy killed (although they are important criteria) but rather the number of attitudes which were influenced in favor of the friendly government. Although hearts and minds sometimes defy measurement, it can be established that the Huk insurgents lost 2,714 guerrillas killed in 1,971 encounters during a specific fifteen month period in 1951 and 1952 (Figure 14). Three additional bonus effects were also realized. First the Filipino people regained their sense of personal security, pride in their heritage, their

³⁴Taruc, op. cit., p. 137.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Encounters</u>	<u>Guerrillas Killed</u>
1951	January	134	292
	February	126	194
	March	112	160
	April	122	196
	May	122	172
	June	118	143
	July	157	186
	August	156	230
	September	166	280
	October	132	182
	November	103	106
	December	102	130
1952	January	130	134
	February	150	177
	March	136	127
TOTAL	15	1,971	2,714

FIGURE 14: Guerrillas killed in AFP - Huk Encounters. (Adapted from Robert H. Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency, Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1963.)

nation and confidence in their government. Secondly, Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense emerged as the nemesis of the Huk's and the champion of the people. Finally, the Republic of the Philippines emerged as one of the more influential nations in the Western Pacific. In this new capacity, President Quirino hosted an Asian Conference in Manila in October 1952. Attending the conference were representatives from Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Malaya and Australia. Secretary Magsaysay briefed the delegates on the internal defense campaign being conducted (and won) at that time and also made a plea for Asian unity against "Southeast Asia's common foe."³⁵

When elected President, Magsaysay initiated the social programs which he could not as the Defense chief. Particularly reform within the government. Most of the actions, some with questions relative to authority were done on the basis of promise.³⁶

³⁵"Step to Unity," Life, XXXIII (October 13, 1952), p. 53.

³⁶Warden, "Robin Hood of the Islands," p. 26.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study was undertaken to examine the hypothesis that Ramon Magsaysay the person, and the unique Psychological Operations which he employed to a large extent was responsible for the "defeat" of the Hukbalahap insurgency. That without that condominium, the results of the operation would have been considerably less than the results depicted in this research. A brief recapitulation of the results of the study follow. It will be pointed out that nation building, internal development, unconventional warfare and a host of other vehicles were employed in the conflict; however, all had a PSYOP impact and the mental attitudes influenced remain the one basic, significant factor identified.

In the preceding pages, real evidence has been provided to establish how an honest and determined leader was able to move a fledgling young nation, having withstood the ravages of war, toward true independence and greatness in spite of seemingly insurmountable odds.

The Filipino guerrillas fought bravely against a determined Japanese enemy during World War II; however, after the war, one element of this force emerged as the Hukbalahap, a Communist led insurgent force which was dedicated ostensibly to land reform. In reality, the insurgents directed their efforts toward the overthrow of the legally constituted government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Ramon Magsaysay, former guerrilla commander, Provincial Governor and Congressman, having been appointed Secretary of National Defense and

later elected President of the Philippine Republic succeeded in removing the threat of the insurgents by a three pronged attack, when others before him had failed.

After an exhaustive study of the insurgency problem, an overall reform program was instituted in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This included the elimination of ineffective leaders and units, updating conventional organization to an internal defense posture, better pay and veterans benefits, and effective guidance and direction. The second step included a psychological operations plan for strategic and tactical application, to include intelligence, civilian cooperation and most importantly the integration of PSYOP into military operations against the insurgents. The final step was the institution of reforms in the government and social reform in the country. In many cases as the Defense Secretary, Magsaysay had little power to influence reform actions outside the Defense Department; however, as President he realized his fullest dreams.

Within the above three broad areas the following were achieved:

1. Restoration of confidence in the government.
2. Anti-Huk psychological campaign was a success.
3. Military action against the Huks was successful.
4. Civic improvements were made.
5. Resettlement programs for reformed insurgents were created and supported.
6. Reform within the government was achieved.
7. Compassion for the insurgents who surrendered was always demonstrated.

Although statistics vary in the many sources examined, one source

dared to list the following concrete results of the AFP-HKP conflict:

1. 20,000 troops were in the Huks ranks on September 1, 1950
(the day Magsaysay assumed duties as Defense Secretary).

2. During the next two years:

9,000 Huks surrendered

4,000 were killed by government troops

980 commanders were captured.¹

In the words of Ramon Magsaysay himself, relative to the accomplishments of the campaign:

First I cleaned up the Army. We had a lot of Court Martials. Then pretty soon the officers knew I meant business . . . Now I have a good Army. I then told them to win the confidence of the people. When someone was sheltering Huks, we took him a bag of rice, offered rewards for information and paid the rewards. I set up a system of free telegrams for people who had a complaint about the Army or information about the Huks . . . They got action right away . . . we appealed to the Huks by radio, by dropping messages, by talking to Huks women and children . . . we got the government to set aside land, an Army agency cleared the area and built homes. We got plows and farm animals with Mutual Security Agency money . . . We are feeding thousands of Huks families and sending their children to school. We go into the jungle and kill Huks, seek out their headquarters and capture it and always keep him moving.²

Not stated in the above quotation which was gleaned from an interview, was personal insight into the man himself. The study however reveals that at each stage of his life and in all of his undertakings, Ramon Magsaysay displayed warmth, compassion and deep concern for his country and the welfare of his people. His profound honesty and lack of concern for personal material rewards made him a leader in the truest sense of the word. His leadership was recognized not only among the Filipino people but among Americans and the entire world community. He was truly a leader in the sense of the following definition:

¹Ramon Magsaysay (an interview), "He smashed the Communists," U. S. News and World Report XXXIV (February 13, 1950), 30.

²Ibid.

1. An individual in a given office.
2. the central person of a group whose personality is incorporated in the "ego ideals" of his followers.
3. the person considered most influential by members of the group.
4. the person who does most to advance the group toward its goals.
5. the person who is most effective in creating a situation or consistency in the interaction of the group members.³

Conclusion

In combat, there is no substitute for closing with and destroying the enemy in armed combat. In an internal defense situation, however, military action alone will not defeat guerrilla forces. An in depth study of any internal defense problem would, as was the case in the Philippines Insurgency, reveal deep seated social ills which a government must address if it is to win the war and influence the hearts and minds of its citizens.

In the Philippines, social problems which dated back to the latter part of the 16th century influenced the formation of the Hukbalahap insurgent organization. The military effort against the Hukks was only effective after the marriage of that effort with a unique and effective PSYOP plan. This plan although well planned and all inclusive was most effective due to the fact that it was created and supervised by a unique person--Ramon Magsaysay. I can therefore conclude that this very same plan, if created and directed by another person, at that particular point and time would have been less effective.

The credibility of the above position is best voiced by Carlos Romulo, Philippine leader and statesman when he spoke of the success of the anti-Huk effort as follows:

There is more to this formula than his projects for subduing and then rehabilitating the Huk rebels, more than the program of land reform, more than even his fight to raise the living standards of the rural masses and to rid the government of corruption. Above and

³Haven C. Smith, The Effects of Leadership (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 8.

beyond these measures is the intangible and magnetic quality of the man himself that gave life and inspiration to the Asian crusade for freedom.⁴

⁴ Romulo, The Nagsaway Story, p. 6.

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